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I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the ntimber of corporate bankruptcy filings has skyrocketed.
Specifically, in 1980 there were 11,742 corporate bankruptcy filings, 2 while in

1 B.A., Northwestern University, 1986; J.D., cure laude, University of Chicago, 1989;
L.L.M. (Taxation), New York University, 1992. Currently an associate at D'Ancona and
Pflaum in Chicago. The author would like to thank George R. Goodman of Hopkins and
Sutter, Professor Marjorie Kornhauser of Tulane Law School, Professor Katherine Pratt
of St. Louis University Law School and Richard A. Whalen of Price Waterhouse for
giving me their comments on an earlier draft of this article.
2

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, FEBRUARY 1992 37-40, table B-92 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office 1992) [hereinafter 1992 REPORT].
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1990 there were 60,409:3 a 514% increase for the ten year period. 4 Alarge portion
of this increase is likely to be permanent because it was not caused by cyclical
factors such as the recent recession. This is shown by the fact that even during
the boom years of the Eighties, corporate bankruptcy filings rose at a high rate. 5
Commentators have given different explanations for this increase, 6 but almost
all agree that the rate of bankruptcy filings is likely to stay at a higher level than
7
has historically been the case.
Often one of the largest assets of a bankrupt corporation is its net operating
losses ("NOLs").8 An NOL results from losses or deductions that exceed taxable
income for a year. The amount of the excess is the NOL for the year. 9 The excess
losses do not necessarily result in an immediate tax benefit because our system
does not allow for negative amounts of tax. 10 However, an NOL can be used
to offset taxable income for other years.1 1 Generally, an NOL is first used to
offset income from the three years prior to the year the losses were incurred, 12
resulting in an immediate refund of taxes paid. If a person had no taxable
income during the three prior years, the NOL can be carried forward up to 15

3

1d.

4

This rise continued into 1991, where there were 87,592 corporate bankruptcies, a
rise of over 27,000 from 1990. Id. However, this increase is likely due to the current
recession.
5
1n the height of the 1980s boom (1983-1988) each year the number of corporate
bankruptcy filings increased by approximately 120%. Id.
6

James D. Key, Note, The Advent of the Serial Chapter 11 Filing and Its Implications, 8

BANK. DEV. J. 245 (1991). This describes how junk bonds have increased the rate of
bankruptcies by increasing the amount of debt outstanding. Id. The rise in corporate
bankruptcy filings is probably in part due to the rise in the number of incorporations
during the Eighties. 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at table B-92. To some extent the savings
and loan crisis may have increased these numbers, although they are too big to be
explained by this alone. James D. Barth, THE GREAT SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE (AEI

Press, Washington, D.C. 1991).
7
See authorities cited supranote 6; see also, Donald R. Korobkin, RehabilitatingValues:
A Jurisprudenceof Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717(1991); Gary B.Wilcox, IssuingMixed
Considerationin Troubled Debt Restructurings, 10 VA. TAX. REV. 357 (1990).
8

Robert A. Rizzi, Filling in the Gaps: Newly Proposed and Temporary Regs Clarify
Bankruptcy Loss CarryforwardRules, 19 J.CORP. TAXN 134 (1992); GORDON D. HENDERSON
& STUART J. GOLDRING, FAILING AND FAILED BUSINESSES

1 11 (CCH 1992).

9

1.R.C. § 172(a).
10Although such a system has been proposed, see Mark Campisano & Roberta
Romano, Recouping Losses: The Casefor Full Loss Offsets, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 709 (1981).
11I.R.C. § 172(a).
12
1.R.C. § 172(b). There is an election to use the NOLs only to offset income from
future years. Id. In § 172(b)(3), without this election, the NOLs will first offset income in
the third year prior to the creation of the NOL, then it will offset income from the year
after that, and if it is not yet used up, it then will offset income of the year prior to the
loss year. Only if there are NOLs remaining after this will any be carried forward. Id.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss1/3
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years.1 3 A corporation which has net operating losses is often referred to as a
14
"loss corporation."
The Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") creates restrictions on the use of
NOLs if the ownership of the corporation has changed between the time the
NOL was created and the time it is utilized. 15 Different rules govern the use of
carrybacks and the use of carryforwards.' 6 The rules regarding carrybacks are
contained in § 381 of the code, 17 whereas the rules governing carryforwards
are contained not only in § 381, but also in §§ 382,384, and in the consolidated
return regulations under § 1502.18 Section 269 also places additional limits on
both carryforwards and carrybacks.
This paper focuses on the use of carryforwards in a bankruptcy situation. In
particular, it examines the economic implications of Treasury Regulation
§ 1.269-3(d), 19 which was finalized on January 6, 1992. This regulation creates
a presumption that if the acquirer of a loss corporation does not continue the
corporation's business, the transaction was consummated for tax avoidance
purposes. Therefore, under § 269, which limits the use of NOLs after an
acquisition, the loss corporation's NOLs cannot be used by the acquirer. This
presumption, however, can be overcome by strong evidence that other motives
controlled the decision.
This article discusses the contours of the limitation created by § 1.269-3(d),
and concludes that, notwithstanding the ability to Overcome its presumption,
this provision essentially imposes a continuity of business enterprise
requirement for the NOLs of a loss company to survive. That is, an acquirer

13

1.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A). Banks and REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts) have

different rules for when they can use NOLs. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(B)-(C).
14

1.R.C. § 382(k)(1) defines a loss corporation as a corporation entitled to use an NOL
carryover, or having an NOL for the year of an ownership change.
15

These include I.R.C. §§ 269, 381, 382, and 384, as well as the rules that apply to a
consolidated return situation under I.R.C. § 1502, such as the separate return limitation
year (SRLY) and the consolidated return change of ownership (CRCO) rules- I.R.C.
§§ 1.1502-15, 21. On January 29, 1991, the Treasury issued proposed regulations which
eliminate the CRCO rules, CO-132-87. Prop. Reg. § 1.1502-21A(g)(3); BORIS I. BITrKER &
JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS

I 13.45[61[a] (6th ed. 1994).
16 Carrybacks are NOLS that are used to offset prior income. KEVIN E. MURPHY,
CONCEPTSIN FEDERAL TAXATION 288 (1994). Carryforwards are NOLs that are not carried
back and so must be used to offset future income. Id.

17Libson Shops Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957), may also place restrictions on
carrybacks.
18
There are also special alternative minimum tax NOL restrictions in I.R.C.
§ 56(d)(1)(A) which are not discussed in this paper.

19 Treasury Regulations will be referred to by section numbers. They are
distinguished from Code sections by the form of the section number. Code sections are
a simple number, whereas Regulations have a number preceding the section number.
For example, § 269 for code sections and § 1.269-3(d) for treasury regulations.
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must continue the loss corporation's business or use its assets in an active trade
or business in order to use the NOLs.
After discussing the scope of the rule, the article goes on to analyze whether
this limit promotes economic efficiency. In particular, it examines the incentives
that § 1.269-3(d) gives to new owners of a loss corporation. It also examines the
differences between a "regular" situation, (i.e. where the loss corporation is not
in bankruptcy) where there is an explicit continuity of business enterprise
requirement 20 and in situations where § 382(l)(5) applies, which do not have a
continuity of business enterprise requirement, absent this regulation. 21 The
article concludes that § 1.269-3(d) creates inefficient incentives for the acquirers
of a bankrupt corporation to retain the corporation's business or assets. The
standard used for determining whether a tax rule promotes economic
efficiency is whether it is "neutral," i.e. whether it does not alter decisions from
those that would be made in a tax-free world. 22
The article also analyzes whether the concerns which motivated the creation
of this regulation are best addressed by imposing a presumption based on the
continuity of business enterprise, and, if this is not the case, how the concerns
that motivated the institution of this presumption can be better addressed by
amending the § 269 regulations.
Part I analyzes the structure of the current law as well as discussing some of
the concerns that motivated Congress, the Courts, and the Treasury in the law's
creation, focusing on economic efficiency. Part II discusses whether the
§ 1.269-3(d)'s continuity requirement furthers the goal of economic efficiency.
Part III discusses the various alternatives to § 1.269-3(d) that have been
presented and gives some suggestions for how the § 269 regulations might be
structured to increase efficiency.
This article does not focus on whether the rules are consistent with the
legislative intent behind §§ 269 and 382, although consideration is given to this
question to the extent that economic efficiency played a role in the creation of
these sections. Furthermore, it does not discuss whether the Treasury had the
power to impose these rules or whether it was necessary for Congress to do so.
It also does not consider other controversial regulations under §§ 269 and 382
20

Section 382(c) requires continuity of business for any of the NOLs to be used. Its

rules are based on the continuity of business requirements for reorganizations in
§ 1.368-(1)(d). See infra text accompanying notes 104-11.
21
See discussion of § 1.382-3(m) infra text accompanying notes 115-16.
22

Neutrality is a frequently (perhaps the most frequently) used tool for tax policy
analysis. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX xxi (1989). There are other modes of
analysis such as equity. However, when dealing with the corporate tax, it is very difficult
to analyze because of the lack of clarity on the incidence of the corporate tax. J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr., Reflections on Section 382: Searching for a Rationale, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 213,
217-219. It seems particularly appropriate to use neutrality as a-measure of the NOL
limits because the 1986 Tax Reform was attempting to make these rules as "neutral" as
possible. JOINT COMMrITEE, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
294, 295 (date) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE]; see discussion infra text accompanying

notes 205-207.
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23 All of these topics already have been
finalized on the same day as § 1.269-3(d).
24
examined at length elsewhere.
It is possible this regulation may some day be invalidated. However, if this
occurs, the analysis of this paper will not be moot. If a court invalidates this
regulation, it would be on the grounds that the Treasury did not have the

26
authority to issue it.25 It would not be on policy grounds. If this regulation is
invalidated, the question would arise whether Congress should adopt this
limitation. The analysis of this problem would be essentially the same as that

presented in this paper.

II. CURRENT LAW
The discussion of the NOL rules will begin by illustrating the concerns which
motivated their creation and subsequent revision. Then, it will lay out the basic
NOL rules, while at the same time, examining how they fit into the overall plan

of preventing "abuse."
The NOL rules were originally created to equalize the treatment of
businesses with stable incomes and those with fluctuating incomes. To

illustrate, assume there are two corporations, A and B. A earns $50 every year.
B earns $150 every odd year and loses $50 every even year. Over time, the two
corporations will have equal incomes [150 - 50 = 50 + 50 = 100]27 and so over
28
time should pay the same amount of tax. However, if NOLs are not allowed,
B will pay a higher amount of tax. Assume that the corporate tax rate is 35%.
In year 1, A pays $17.50 tax [$50 X .35] and B pays $52.50 [150 X .35]. In year 2,
A pays $17.50 again and B pays $0 tax. So in every two year period, A will pay
$35 in tax and B will pay $52.50, even though their incomes are the same. By
allowing B to carry the year 2 loss back to the previous year, the amount of tax

23

However, one regulation, § 1.269-5, which was finalized on the same day, is
discussed to the extent that it affects the analysis of § 1.269-3(d). See discussion infra text
accompanying notes 183-87.
24

Lee A. Sheppard, New Tax Avoidance Regs Avoid Bankruptcy Court, 54 TAX NOTES
116 (1992); Janet A. Meade & Janice E. McCellan, Loss Carryovers in CorporateBankruptcy
Reorganizations Under Prop. Reg § 1.269-3(d), 69 TAXES 229 (1991).
25
Many commentators argue that the Treasury did not have the authority to issue
this regulation. See sources cited infra note 209.
26

To invalidate a regulation a court must find that the Treasury has abused its
authority, and the regulation is contrary to legislative intent. Manhattan Gen. Equip.
Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129,134 (1936). This is a very difficult standard of proof.
This paper makes no claims about the validity of the regulation, or whether the
regulation is a reasonable interpretation of § 269. This article only analyzes the economic
impact of the regulation.
27
This ignores time value of money considerations.
28

Under one of the basic principles of tax policy, horizontal equity, taxpayers who
earn similar incomes should pay similar amounts of tax. For a discussion of horizontal
equity, see Richard A. Musgrave, HorizontalEquity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1990).
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each pays is equalized. Under this regime, every two years, again A pays $35
29
but B would pay $35 as well.

The limitations on NOLs were created in order to prevent abuse of the NOL
rules. "Abuse,"30 for purposes of this paper, occurs when two conditions are
present: 1) there has been a change in the ownership of the loss corporation;
and 2) the NOLs are used to offset income from a business other than that which
generated the losses. 3 1 This is referred to as abuse, because NOLs were
intended to equalize income within a single business. 32 To illustrate the
problem, assume that A owned a corporation (X Co.) which conducted a
business that had generated NOLs. A had grown weary of this business and
decided to sell it. A sold X Co. to B who promptly liquidated the assets of X's
current business and started a new business. Obviously, B bought X Co. for its
tax attributes (specifically its NOLs) because it promptly sold all of X's other
assets. If B can fully utilize all of XCo.'s NOLs, B is in exactly the same position
as if it had purchased A's losses directly.33
The discussion of the rules dealing with the use of NOLs begins with § 381
and related case law, which determine whether NOLs survive an acquisition.
Then, it will examine the limits that §§ 269,382, and other sections place on the
survival and rate of use of NOLs. The analysis breaks up into two parts: the
general rules, and the rules that apply when the loss corporation is in
Bankruptcy.
A. Survival of NOLs Post-Acquisition

The analysis of whether NOLs survive a corporate transaction begins with
§ 381. Section 381 identifies the situations in which the attributes of a
corporation may be carried over into another corporation. It applies to
transactions where the assets of one corporation are acquired by another either
in a liquidation to which § 332 applies, 34 or by means of an "A," "C,"non-divi-

29

B's taxes are $51 - (50 x .34 = 17) = $34.

30

The use of the term "abuse" or "abusive" is not meant to imply a value judgement.
The term is merely used to denote those transactions which have the two characteristics
described above.
31 Michael R. Asimow, Detrimentand Benefit of Net OperatingLosses:A Unifying Theory,
24 TAX L. REV. 1, 45-48 (1968). Asimow uses the same definition and argues that only
when these two conditions are present should we worry about tax avoidance. Id. In fact,
this isa common notion of whatshould beprevented. SeeJames B.Loken, Loss Carryovers
and CorporateAlterations: Toward a Uniform Approach, 52 MINN. L. REV. 571, 620 (1968).
32
See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 22.
33

The price paid for the NOLs being the difference between the amount B paid for
X and the amount received on the sale of X's assets.
34
An I.R.C. § 332 liquidation occurs when a subsidiary that is 80% owned by its
parent is liquidated into its parent.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss1/3
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sive "D," "F," or "G" reorganization. 35 A common denominator among these
transactions is that they are all tax-free transactions (at least in part)36 and the
acquiring corporation takes a carryover basis in the assets that it receives from
the transferor.
If one of these acquisitions takes place, then the NOLs and the other
attributes specified in § 381(c) 3 7 will carryover from the transferor corporation
The acquired corporation's taxable year ends
to the transferee corporation. 38
39
transaction.
the
of
date
on the
As for transactions other than those specified in § 381(a), the code is silent.
The legislative history states that both for transactions that are not specified in
the section and for attributes not listed, 40 no inference is to be drawn as to
whether or not they carryover. 41 Therefore, it seems that prior law would
apply.42 Prior law, which was predominantly case law, used the "Entity
Approach," which allows the carryover of the attribute if the entity which
incurred the loss is the same as that which is attempting to use the NOL. 43 In
other words, if the corporate entity that incurred the loss survives, so do its
NOLs.44 For example, assume A purchases X Co.'s stock from B (X's current
owner), and A continues to keep X Co. in existence. X Co. can continue to use

35

These are the transactions described in I.R.C. § 368(a)(1). Each particular
transaction is referred to by the letter of its subparagraph within this section.
36

1f there is "boot", i.e. if the transferors receive property other than stock or securities
of the transferee, then it is possible that the gain up to the amount of the "boot" will be
recognized. I.R.C. § 361(b).
37

The attributes described in I.R.C. § 381(c) include items such as earnings and
profits, capital loss carryovers, etc.
38
These attribute transfers are subject to certain restriction contained in I.R.C.
§ 381(b).
39

1.R.C. § 381(b).

40

This would include failed reorganizations as well as straight purchases and "B"
reorganizations, which are described in I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B).
41S. REP No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 277 (1954).
42

This follows because if § 381 does not tell us, we must revert to what was the law
prior to its passage. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 15, at 14.02; New Colonial Ice
Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
43
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1934); Alprosa Watch
Corp. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 240, 245 (1948).
44
Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 306 U.S. 522 (1939), held that if the assets
were acquired in a statutory merger, the identity of the transferor corporation was
"submerged" into that of the transferee corporation and the NOLs could be used by the
transferee. However, this doctrine only applied where local law held that the identity
of the transferor and transferee were the same. Id. This was not always the case. See
BITIrKER & EusTICE, supra note 42.
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its NOLs that arose while it was owned by B. 45 On the other hand, if instead of
keeping X Co. operating, A merges X Co. into Y Co. (a corporation wholly
owned by A) with Y Co. surviving, in a transaction that is not specified in § 381
(e.g. a failed "C"reorganization), then the NOLs cannot be used. This is because
Y Co. did not incur X Co.'s losses. 46
B. Restrictions on the Survival and Use of NOLs
1. General Rules
a. Section 382 Limit on Rate of Use
Even though the NOLs can be carried forward under § 381 or prior case law,
§ 382 places restrictions on their use. The purpose behind the § 382 limits is to
prevent "abusive" transactions. 4 7 It does this by attempting to eliminate any
disparity in the value of the NOLs between the owner and the purchaser.
An NOUs value is always exactly equal to the amount of tax it can save. 48
NOLs have no intrinsic value in and of themselves. 4 9 Their value lies in their
ability to reduce taxes. For example, if a corporation has $1 million of taxable
income, and the net effective tax rate is 30%, a $1 million NOL is worth the taxes
the corporation would otherwise have to pay on its income, or $300,000.
A potential acquirer will place a higher value on an NOL than the current
owner only if the acquirer can use the NOL faster than the current owner.50
This difference in value is based on the difference between the present value of
the NOL to the two taxpayers. For example, if A can use the $1 million NOL all
in one year, the value to A of the NOL is $300,000, assuming a 30% tax rate. If

45
This would also be the case in a "B" reorganization in which the stock of the
acquiring corporation is exchanged for the stock of the loss corporation. Here, the loss
corporation survives as well. Therefore, so do its NOLs.
46
There are great possibilities of manipulation of this rule. For example, instead of
the acquiring corporation surviving the merger, the loss corpora tion could survive. This
would allow the survivor to use the NOLs.
47
See s1pra text accompanying notes 37-50.
48
For purposes of this illustration, we assume that NOLs are freely transferable. This
is not the law as we shall soon see. The point is to show the possible abuses under the
most liberal allowance of NOL carryforwards.
49
1t seems very unlikely that anyone gets any psychic income from having NOLs to
offset current income.
50

A disparity could also arise if there is a difference in marginal rate. But, we are
dealing with corporations, and the corporate tax is essentially a flat tax. See I.R.C. § 11.
NOLs can also have state tax consequences, but these are not analyzed in this paper.
Generally, they will only alter the size of the distortions, not whether they occur.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss1/3
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B can only use the NOL at a rate of $333,333 a year, it has a discounted present
value to B of $278,326.46. 5 1 The faster the NOL can be used, the higher thevalue.
A disparity in the value of a NOL between the purchaser and the current
owner can create incentives for either a buyer to purchase the loss corporation,
or the current owner to sell it. In both situations, the tax system is acting in a
52
non-neutral way, which reduces the efficiency of the system.
In the first situation (i.e. where the purchaser's incentives are altered), the
tax system (via NOLs) creates an incentive for a person contemplating an
acquisition to prefer acquiring a loss corporation rather than a corporation
without NOLs. For example, assume there are two corporations, X and Y, both
having assets worth $7 million to their respective current owners and $8 million
to a potential acquirer, p.53 p will be indifferent as to which corporation it
acquires. However, if because of tax attributes such as NOLs, X is now worth
$9 million to P while Y is still worth $8 million, P would prefer to purchase X.
In order for this bias to arise, there must be a disparity between P and X in
the value of the tax attribute. That is, if both P and X can fully utilize an NOL
at the same rate, it will have the same value to both of them. 54 In order for X's
shareholders to sell their interests in X, they will have to be compensated for
both the value of X's assets and the value of X's NOLs to them. This value is
precisely the same as the value of the NOL to P. So, while X's total value to P is
increased by the value of the NOL ($1 million in the above example), P will
have to pay the full value of this increase. P then faces the choice of buying
either X, which is worth $8 million, for $8 million, or Y, which is worth $7
million, for $7 million. P will again be indifferent about which it acquires. 55
In the other situation (i.e., where the seller's incentives are altered), the tax
system creates an incentive for the current owner, who, in this example is the

51 Using a discount rate of 8%. Discounting $100,000 a year for three years at a rate
of 8% equals $278,326.46. Of course, if the discount rate is higher the value to B of the
loss would be even less. Consequently, the disparity in value of the NOL would be
greater.
52
See infra text accompanying notes 192-201.
53The value of an asset or a corporation to a particular owner, is equal to the net
discounted present value of the future cash flows that this particular owner can generate
from the asset. HARVARD BusINEss SCHOOL, VALUING A BusNEsS ACQUISITION

OPPORTUNITY 1-2 (Harvard Business School Publishing Division 1989). So, if P places a
higher value on assets than the current owner, P can obtain a higher return on the assets
or the same return at a faster rate. The purchase price for a corporation must at least be
equal to its value to its current owners. The assumption in this example is that the current
owners of both X & Y have the same negotiating skills.
54This assumes they are in the same tax bracket. But, as stated in note50, the corporate
tax is essentially a flat rate tax and so it is assumed throughout the paper that the
taxpayers are in the same bracket.
55
Unless P is unable to obtain financing for the $8 million price or the relative costs
of raising money increase for the larger amount.
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most efficient user of the assets, 56 to sell them to someone who can use the
NOLs at a faster rate than the current owner. For example, if the NOL is worth
$200,000 to the current owner and $1 million to a potential buyer, there is a
tax-created incentive for the owner to sell. This can result in inefficient
transactions. 57 It is not necessarily true that the purchaser is a more efficient
user of the assets merely because an NOL is more valuable to the purchaser.5 8
He may be able to use other assets more efficiently and thus create profits to
offset.59
This preference would be created entirely by the tax system and so the system
would be non-neutral as to this decision. The amount of this preference is equal
to the disparity in value of the NOL. That is, if P's value and the current owner's
value for the NOLs diverge by $1 million, the amount of the distortion and the
loss of value the NOL rules introduce is $1 million.60 $8). This yields a net loss
to the system of $.5 (real value of Y = $8, real value of X is $7.5).
Of course, it is possible for both patterns to be evident in a single transaction.
That is, a company contemplating an acquisition might prefer to acquire a loss
corporation because it has NOLs, and the acquiring company is also an
inefficient user of the loss corporation's assets.
Section 382 deals with both of these situations by eliminating the disparity
in value by placing an annual limitation on the use of NOLs following an
ownership change. This rule restricts the amount of income the NOLs will be
able to offset in any given year. The amount of the "annual limitation" for each
56

1f the purchaser is the most efficient user, then there is no loss if the seller transfers
the corporation to the purchaser. But this transfer would occur under a system which

did not allow NOL carryovers as well, because the purchaser could pay the seller more

for the corporation than it was worth to the seller. So, NOLs would not alter the
incentives in this situation.
57

However, it may merely be offsetting other problems such as the lock-in effect
which results when holders of assets may not want to sell them because of the taxation
on all the accrued gain. See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 1 FEDERAL TAXATION
OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS T 3.5.7 (1989).
58For example, the purchaser may generate enormous profits from its other business
and yet be able to generate no profit from the loss companies business.
59
1t is unclear whether there would be a lasting drop in efficiency. All the purchaser
is really interested in is NOLs of the corporation. If the old owners were in fact more
efficient users of the assets, then it would make sense to sell the assets back to them. Of
course, the logic of this second transaction would depend on whether the tax code would
respect the first sale if this occurred. It is ironic that limits designed to prevent inefficient
transactions might in fact promote them by forcing the purchasers to inefficiently retain
the assets.
60
This distortion arises entirely because P purchases a corporation that it otherwise
would not have. To illustrate, if we ignore NOLs, assume Y has a value of $8 million to
P and X has a value of $7.5 million to P (X & Y each still have a value of $7 million to
their respective current owners). P will prefer to purchase Y. If P places a value on X's
NOLs of $.7 million, then X has a value of $8.2 million to P ($7.5 + $.7). Assume Y has
no NOLs, so its value remains $8 million. All other things being equal, P will prefer to
purchase X over Y ($8.2
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year is equal to the long-term tax exempt rate61 times the value of the stock of
the loss company 62 immediately before the ownership change. 63 For example,
if the value of the stock of the corporation is $1 million and if the current § 382
rate is 6%, the loss corporation can only use $60,000 of its NOLs per year, no
matter what the total amount of its NOLs. 64 This is an attempt to determine
the value of the NOL to the current owners and then ensure that the purchaser
cannot place a higher value on it.65 There are serious questions as to whether
the limitation accomplishes this,66 but this is beyond the scope of the paper.
The rules governing when there is an ownership change, which are quite
complicated, 67 are designed to ensure that if true beneficial ownership of the
corporation shifts, there will be a ownership change for purposes of § 382.
There also are rules on what constitutes a loss, and what income can be offset
against what losses, in order to ensure that tax planning yields few benefits. 68
Section 382(c) imposes a continuity of business enterprise requirement on
the carryforward of losses. If the acquirer does not satisfy the provisions of this
section, the annual limit on the NOLs is reduced to zero retroactively to the
date of the ownership change.

61The long-term tax exempt rate is defined as federal long-term rate as determined
by I.R.C. § 1274(d) and adjusted for differences between tax exempt & taxable
instruments. I.R.C. § 382(0. This rate is published monthly in revenue rulings. The rate
for November 1994 is 6.25%. Rev. Rul. 94-67, I.R.B. 1994-45.
62
1.R.C. § 382(b). This includes all equity, but excludes debt. Equity includes all the
stock, including I.R.C. § 1504(a)(4) stock (non-convertible, non-voting preferred).
63
The I.R.C. § 382(l)(6) rule allows for a different value and is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 201-206.
64$1 million x 6% = $60,000. See supra note 61 for the recent rate. Throughout the
article a 6% rate will be used for illustrative purposes.
65
It attempts to do this by establishing a rate which is similar to that which the loss
company would have used. Since the owners could always have sold the assets and
bought government bonds, it was decided that the NOLs should be allowed at least at

that rate. Carryover of Net Operating Losses and Other Tax Attributes of Corporations:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways and Means

House of Represenatives,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985) (statement of Ronald A. Pearlman,
Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Dep't of Treasury).
66
For a discussion of this see Daniel Q. Posin, Three Strikes Are We Out? Transfer of
Loss Carryovers After the 1986 Act, 7 VA. TAX REV. 697 (1988); Daniel L. Simmons, Net
Operating Losses and Section 382: Searching for a Limitation on Loss Carryforwards, 63 TUL.
L. REV. 1015 (1989); George K. Yin, Of Diamonds and Coal: A Retrospective Examination of
the Loss Carryover Controversy, 48 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAXN 41 (Pt. 2 1990); Fleming,
supra note 22.
67

Even a brief description of these rules is lengthy. For a discussion of these rules see
the series of Articles by Mark J. Silverman &Kevin M. Keyes, New Ownership Regs under
Section 382: Part 1,68 J. TAX'N 68 (1988); Part1!, 68 J. TAX'N 142 (1988); Part11168 J. TAx'N
300 (1988); Part IV, 69 J.TAx'N 42 (1988).
68
1.R.C. § 382(h) causes net unrealized built-in losses to be treated as pre-acquisition
losses, and NOLs can be used freely against net unrealized built-in gain.
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Ex 1. A purchases T Corp. and after the ownership change the annual
limitation on A's use of T's NOLs = $100,000. If A liquidates all of T's
business, A cannot use any of T's NOLs.
In order to avoid this result, the acquirer must either continue a significant
historic business of the loss corporation or continue to usea significant portion
of the company's assets in a trade or business for two years after the
acquisition. 69 The historic business is the business the loss corporation was
engaged in before the transaction. 70 For example, if T has been engaged in a
clothing business for ten years, but immediately prior to, and in contemplation
of its acquisition, T sells its assets and uses the proceeds to enter a business its
acquirer desires, the historic business of T remains the clothing business. 71 The
purchaser must either continue the clothing business or use its assets in a trade
or business in order to use T's NOLs.
The effect of this limit is to deter those who are interested in acquiring only
the tax attributes of a corporation. Under this limit, if A sells the unwanted
assets, then A will not be able to use the "tax assets" either.
b. Section 269 Limit
After § 382 has been applied to an acquisition, the taxpayer must still
overcome the hurdle of § 269 to use the NOLs. Section 269 will disallow a loss
carryforward (or any other deduction or tax benefit) if the principal purpose
of the acquisition of the loss corporation was tax avoidance. 72 Specifically, § 269
provides that: if 1) any person or persons acquire control 73 of a corporation; or
2) any corporation acquires property of another unrelated corporation in a
carryover basis transaction, 74 and the "principal purpose" of the acquisition
was evasion of federal income tax by securinga benefit the taxpayer would not
otherwise enjoy, the IRS may disallow all or part of the NOLs of the loss
corporation, as well as other tax benefits. 75

69

This limit is the same as that for reorganizations under Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d).
H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075.
This is helpful in defining the term, beca use there has been a great deal of case law under
the Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) rule. See Peter Faber, Continuity of Interest and Business
Enterprise:Is it Time to Bury Sonie Sacred Cows, 34 TAX LAw. 239 (1981).
70

Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1.

71

Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(9) ex. 3.

72

1.R.C. § 269(a).

73

Control is defined as ownership of stock that possesses at least 50% of the total
combined voting power of all classes entitled to vote or at least 50% of the total value of
shares of all classes of stock of the corporation. I.R.C. § 269(a).
74

For example, the transactions listed in I.R.C. § 381(a) are carryover basis
transactions. A carryover basis transaction is one in which the basis of the transferor in
the asset "carries over" to the transferee. MURPHY, supra note 16, at 462-63.
75

I.R.C. § 269.
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The key question under § 269 is whether the "principal purpose" of the
acquisition was federal income tax avoidance. The regulations somewhat
clarify the definition of "principal purpose." If the desire to avoid federal
income tax exceeds in importance any other purpose, it is the principal
purpose. 76 However, it is not necessarily true that the principal purpose of the
transaction was federal tax avoidance merely because it would not have
occurred but for the federal tax benefits. 77 In order for tax avoidance to be the
principal purpose, it must be the most important reason.
The section seems to require placing each of the acqurier's motives into one
of two categories: tax avoidance, or other motives. After this, § 269 mandates
weighing the motives in both categories against each other to determine which
is stronger.78
In making this determination, the regulations specify certain facts that
should be considered. One of the most important is whether the tax attributes
have already been subject to limitations such as § 382.79 The idea is that, if § 382
so limits the NOLs as to make them of little value, it is unlikely that the
acquisition was for tax avoidance purposes.
In most situations where § 382 applies, it does severely limit the usefulness
of NOLs. 80 Under § 382,81 this rate is multiplied by the value of the stock of the
loss corporation to derive the annual NOL limitation. If the NOL is a significant
portion of the value of the corporation, then its net present value will be
82
substantially less than it would have been without this restriction.
Section 1.269-3(b)(1) examines another important point in this analysis.
Under this section, if an acquirer inputs capital from the acquirer's business
into the loss corporation, this action indicates that the principal purpose of the

76

Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(a).

77

For example, if tax avoidance was only one percent of the reason for the acquisition
butwithout it theacquisition would nothave taken place, then even though it is a but-for
cause, it was still not the principal purpose.
78
See Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(a); see alsoJ. CLIFTON FLEMING, TAX ASPECrs OF BUYING AND
SELLING CORPORATE BUSINESSES 18.12 (1991).
79

Treas. Reg. § 1.269-7.

80

See Rizzi, supra note 8.

81

See supra note 61 for recent rate.

82

For example, if NOLs are 50% of the value of the stock and the § 382 rate is 6%, it
will take 8.33 years to use up the NOLs. If these NOLs currently have a value of 50 if
used immediately (the corresponding total value of the stock would be 100), the slower
use results in a present value of these NOLs of 34.61, discounting at a rate of 8%. More
than 30% of the value of the NOLs was lost. Notice that the 50% figure for the value of
the NOLs does not imply that the NOL has a value equal to 50% of the assets. Debt,
which is an important method of corporate finance, is not included in this calculation,
and so the value of the NOL could be substantially below 50% of the assets and still be
50% of the value of the stock.
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transaction was tax avoidance, absent evidence to the contrary.83 This
regulation directly addresses situations like that discussed in the example in
section I.A. 84 Notice that placing assets in a loss corporation does not create a
presumption of tax avoidance. It is merely one of many factors. If other factors
indicate another motive, the principal purpose may not be tax avoidance.
85
As might be expected, § 269 often leads to highly unpredictable results.
Whenever the question is what occurred in the mind of the acquirer, it is
difficult to find the truth.86 With any given transaction, it is unclear how a court
or the IRS may treat it.87 This can introduce a great deal of uncertainty in
planning transactions. Of course, under § 382 the limits are often so severe that
it is unlikely that someone would acquire a corporation primarily for its loss
carryforwards. 88
2. Bankruptcy Rules
a. Section 382 Limits
If an ownership change results from a bankruptcy reorganization, different
rules govern the use of NOLs. 89 There are at least three reasons for the
differences. First, all bankruptcy reorganizations are reviewed by the
Bankruptcy Court.90 If the IRS wishes to object to the terms of the plan during

83

This section is based on the idea that if the acquirer uses the NOLs to offset income
from a business other than that which generated the losses, it is possible for there to be
a disparity in value of the NOLs that is not the result of an increase in efficiency.
84
See supra text accompanying notes 37-50. If the new business in that example needs
infusions of capital as most new businesses do (see Parker, infra note 191), then Treas.
Reg. § 1.269-3(b)(1) would say this is a factor indicating tax avoidance.
85
David E. Watts, Acquisitions Made to Avoid Taxes: Section 269, 34 TAx L. REV. 539,
552 (1979).
86
Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in FederalIncome Taxation, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 485 (1967).
87
This is especially true with the no rulings policy. See Rev. Rul. 92-3, 1992-1 I.R.B.,
infra text accompanying notes 195-200.
88
Robert A. Rizzi, Section 382 and the Trigger Rules: Is Congress Beating a Dead Horse?,
14 J. CORP. TAXN 99 (1987).
89

These rules apply to a Title 11 or similar case. Title 11 is the Bankruptcy Code.
There are two types of corporate Title 11 actions: Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter
11 reorganizations. In a Chapter 7 action, the corporation is liquidated; it assets are sold
and the proceeds are used to pay its creditors. In a Chapter 11 action, after the initial
bankruptcy petition is filed, the debtor is allowed to continue to operate its business.
During the bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor must file a reorganization plan. In order
for the plan to become effective, the court must approve it. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988). After
the plan has been approved, certain debts of the corporation can be discharged.
9011 U.S.C. § 1129(d) (1988).
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the bankruptcy proceeding, it is allowed to do so. 9 1 The Bankruptcy Court is
not allowed to permit a reorganization that is merely for tax avoidance. The
parties to the transaction have less control over the terms when a Bankruptcy
92
Court is involved than when they planned the transaction. If a purchaser
planned an abusive transaction, it is unlikely to feel as confident in its ability
to accomplish its goals in the Bankruptcy Court. However, the IRS has the
93
burden of proving that the reorganization was for tax avoidance purposes.
transactions, it probably
While these rules may not prevent all tax-motivated
94
does weed out some very egregious cases.
Also, a bankruptcy proceeding is likely to add significant costs to any
"acquisition" which discourages some parties. 95 Those interested in acquiring
losses may look elsewhere because this reduces the cost-effectiveness of
acquiring these NOLs.
A second reason for more relaxed NOL carryover rules in bankruptcy is that
a creditor is unlikely to lend money to a corporation in order to use the
corporation's NOLs. 96 This would be a very inefficient way to acquire NOLs.
In most bankruptcy proceedings, the creditors do not recover the entire amount
owed to them. 97 Therefore, the creditor risks losing a significant portion of its
investment in order to acquire these NOLs. In fact, the creditors of a bankrupt
losses of others businesses, but
business are generally not trying to acquire
98
rather they are trying to recoup their own.

91

d. This section states that a plan approved should not be for a tax avoidance
purpose. While this rarely occurs it does provide for some lessened concern. Robert A.
Jacobs, The Bankruptcy Court's Emergence as Tax Dispute Arbiter of Choice, 45 TAX LAW.
971,981-84 (1992).
92

Bruce D. Haims, Bankruptcy as a Tax Planning Device: Workouts vs. Chapter 11, 49
N.Y.U. INST. OF FED. TAX'N T 23, 23.02 (1991).
93

However, in a tax court proceeding the taxpayer generally has the burden of proof.
TAX CT. R. 142(a); see also, Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). For these and
other reasons, Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(e) states that the determination of the principal
purpose by the bankruptcy court is not controlling for other courts.
94

This provision's usefulness is limited by the IRS's reticence to use this power. See
Jacobs, supra note 91.
95

See Haims, supra note 92. A basic economic principle is that if you increase the cost
of something, you get less of it.
96

For how lenders decide whether to lend, see generally William K. Strand, Valuation
From a Lender's Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF BusiNiEss VALUATION (Thomas L. West etal.
eds., 1992).
97
Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of
Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1990).
98

Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942); see also
Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 97.
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A third reason for different rules in bankruptcy is the general policy
encouraging the rehabilitation of businesses. 99 Bankruptcy law in general, and
the bankruptcy tax rules in particular, are structured with this motive in mind.
Therefore, Congress and the Treasury have created special rules to protect what
is often the largest asset of a bankrupt corporation, its NOLs.
The survival of NOLs in a bankruptcy situation is particularly a problem due
to the structure of § 382. As stated before, the § 382 limit is based on the value
of the loss corporation. The value of the loss corporation is determined before
the ownership change100 For an insolvent corporation, the value of its stock
will be nominal.1 0 1 The annual limit would therefore be very low,102 and so the
NOLs would have almost no value. The destruction of the NOL would
discourage the rehabilitation of a bankrupt business. 103
Congress had these considerations in mind when it created the current § 382
in 1986.104 Congress carved out two special rules that apply to Title 11 or similar
cases: § 382(1)(5) and § 382(l)(6).
The first of these rules, § 382(l)(5), allows for free transferability of NOLs
with no annual limitation. However, there is a "toll charge" in order to retain
these NOLs. This toll charge is comprised of two parts: 105 the NOLs are reduced
by the amount of the interest that accrued during the three years prior to the
ownership change on the debt that was converted into stock; 106 and 2) the
NOLs are reduced by 50% of the amount that was excluded due to the
stock-for-debt exception. 107 Neither of these reductions attempts to reduce the
99

Korobkin, supra note 7.

100 I.R.C. § 382(e)(1).

101While insolvency is not required for a bankruptcy petition, it is the case that any
corporation that files a bankruptcy petition is likely to have a low stock value (because
debt is high). HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 8, at I11.
1020 x 6 % = 0.
103

1f the value of one of the most important assets of a company drops to zero, the
total value of the company can significantly drop, as well as the desirability of
reorganizing the company.
104 Ridard E. Halperin, Plaming for Loss Carryovers Under Section 382 When a
Corporationis Insolvent, 71 J. TAxN 150 (1989).
105 1)There is also a special rule to ensure that there is no double reduction of NOLs
from these rules. If some of the debt that was discharged is the resultof accrued interest,
the NOLs are only reduced once, not twice. I.R.C. § 382(1)(5)(C)(ii).
10 6

1.R.C. § 382(l)(5)(B). This is because the section views the creditors as owners of the
business. The interest paid is therefore to be treated as dividend and so, therefore, was
not deductible.
107 Under the normal § 108(a) rules, when cancellation of debt income is excluded,
due to a Title 11 case or insolvency of the debtor, the tax attributes (NOLs, basis of assets,
business credits, etc.) of the debtor are reduced. However, if the debt of a corporation
is exchanged for its stock, the normal attribute reduction that results from debt
cancellation in bankruptcy does not occur. Capento Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,
47 B.T.A. 691 (1942), affd, 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944). The stock for debt exception has
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disparity in value, as the § 382 limit does. 108 Rather, they are based on the idea
that the debt holders who received stock should be treated as if they owned the
corporation for the last three years.1 09
Ex.2 X Co. has $1,000 of NOLs and has $700 of debt excluding interest.
It has accrued $210 of interest (both paid and unpaid) in the last 3 years
on this debt. As a result of a bankruptcy proceeding, X discharges half
of its debt ($350) in exchange for its own stock. This stock has a value
of $100. Therefore, without § 108 or the stock-for-debt exception, the
corporation would have $250 of income. Assume that this
reorganization results in an ownership change. If this reorganization
qualifies for § 382(1)(5) treatment, the NOLs are reduced by: 1) interest
accrued on the debt converted into stock ($210 x 1/2) = $105; and 2)
50% of the amount that is excluded from income due to § 108, and did
not result in attribute reduction due to the stock for debt exception
(here $125, which equals $250 x 50%). 110 This totals to $230. Therefore,
after the reorganization, X Co. has $770 ($1,000 - $230) of NOLs which
it can use immediately.
This rule applies only when there has been a § 382 ownership change in a
112
Title 11 or similar case. 111 After the reorganization, 50% or more of the stock
of the corporation must be owned by historic shareholders 113 or qualified
creditors. Qualified creditors include those who held the debt for 18 months or
longer, and those who have lent to the bankrupt corporation in the ordinary
114
course.
These limits are aimed at preventing someone from purchasing a
corporation and its NOLs by acquiring its debt immediately before the
reorganization. In essence, this is the same as purchasing the stock of the

been repealed by modifying § 108(e) for all transfers of stock occurring after December
31, 1994. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13226(a)(1),
107 Stat. 312,487 (1993). An exception is made for stock transferred in a title 11 or similar
cases filed before December 31, 1993. § 13226(a)(3)(6), 107 Stat. at 487-88.
108
See discussion supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
109

1f the creditors had owned the corporation for the last three years, then the interest
accrued would have been a non-deductible dividend.
110
See supra note 107.
111

See supra note 89.

2

11 Fifty percent of both the voting power and the value of the corporation must be
held by the appropriate shareholders. I.R.C. § 382(l)(5)(A)(ii); I.R.C. § 1504(a)(2). This is
in contrast to the general I.R.C. § 382(g) ownership rule which only looks to value.
113
"Historic shareholders" in this context means those who held shares in the
corporation immediately before the confirmation of the plan.
114
1.R.C. § 382(l)(5)(E). Ordinary course means ordinary course of the loss
corporation's business, not the business of the creditor.
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corporation, since the creditor was aware the debt was going to be converted
into stock.
The § 382(c) continuity of business requirement does not operate under
§ 382(l)(5), as stated in § 1.382-3(m). 115 This results because § 382(l)(5) exempts
the NOLs from the § 382 limitation which includes § 382(c)'s continuity of
business requirement. Practioners had assumed there was no continuity of
business requirement until § 1.269-3(d) was proposed. 116 But, as we shall see,
this may no longer be the case.
If another ownership change occurs within two years of the bankruptcy
reorganization, then the § 382(l)(5) rules do not apply. This failure to qualify
for § 382 treatment applies retroactively to the bankruptcy reorganization.
Therefore, the regular § 382 limit applies ab initio. In addition, the § 382 limit
that applies to post-second ownership change income is automatically zero.1 1 7
Assume that A acquires a bankrupt corporation, B Co. and, because it has
income for the year, uses $100,000 of B Co.'s NOLs in year 1. In year 2, if A sells
B Co., the $100,000 of NOLs used in year 1 are subject to the § 382 annual
limit.1 18 On top of this, B Co. cannot use any of its pre-first ownership change
NOLs after the second ownership change.
The second special bankruptcy rule, § 382(1)(6), applies when either the
§ 382(l)(5) requirements are not met, or the taxpayer has elected out of
§ 382(1)(5) treatment. 119 The taxpayer is likely to make this election if the "toll
charge" provisions under § 382(l)(5) significantly reduce the amount of
120
NOLs.
Under § 382(1)(6), the basic § 382 rules apply, including the continuity of
business requirement of § 382(c). 121 However, the value of the corporation for
purposes of calculating the § 382 annual limit is increased by the amount of the
debt that was cancelled in the reorganization.122 As with § 382(l)(5) the
reorganization must occur within the context or a Title 11 or similar case.
115This also follows from Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(c) and the fact that the regular § 382
limit does not apply. Section 382(c) only applies when § 382(a)applies. Under its terms,
when § 382(l)(5) applies, § 382(a) does not. Therefore, if § 382(l)(5) applies, § 382(c) and
its continuity of business enterprise requirement do not.
116Halperin, supra note 104.
117 I.R.C. § 382(l)(5)(D).
118
Section 382(l)(6) may modify the size of this limit, because the corporation is in
bankruptcy. Prop. Reg. § 1.382-3(n)(2).

119Section 382(l)(5)(H) permits a taxpayer to elect out of the § 382(l)(5) provisions.
120 For example, if the bankruptcy was the result of junk bonds, the interest accruals
may be quite large. Section 382(l)(5) is generally used for cases where the business itself,
via depreciation, deductions, etc., has generated the losses, rather than the choice of debt
or equity financing.
12 1

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 104-16; Prop. Reg. § 1.382-3(m)(2).

22

1 Prop. Reg. § 1.382-3(j)-(1) might alter this calculation. But for simplicity, this paper
uses the method described in the statute.
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Ex.3 Under the same facts as Ex.2, if the value of the loss corporation
after the reorganization was equal to $300 (i.e. before the
reorganization it was insolvent by $50) the modified § 382 limit under
§ 382(l)(6) is 6% x $300 = $18.00 per year, giving the NOLs a total
present value of $154.07.123
b. Section 269 Limit in Bankruptcy Situations
As under the general § 382 rules, even after NOLs have run the gauntlet of
§ 382(l)(5) or (1)(6), § 269 can still disallow them altogether if the acquisition
was for tax avoidance purposes.124 This is determined in a manner similar to
that used for "regular" situations. For example, as discussed before, whether
these NOLs are subject to limitation by other sections is a significant factor in
determining the principal purpose. 12 5 NOLs that have survived up to this point
have been subject to either the modified § 382(l)(6) limit or § 382(l)(5) toll
charge. Either of these might severely limit the value of the NOLs.
However, § 1.269-3(d) alters the analysis if § 382(l)(5) applies. This
regulation, which is the subject of this paper, states:
Absent strong evidence to the contrary, a requisite acquisition of
control or property in connection with an ownership change to which
section 382(l)(5) applies is considered to be made for the principal
purpose of evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax unless the
corporation carries on more than an insignificant amount of an active
trade or business during and subsequent to the title 11 or similar case
(as defined by 382(l)(5)(G)). The determination of whether the
corporation carries on more than an insignificant amount of an active
trade or business is made without regard to the continuity of business
enterprise set forth in §1.368-1(d). The determination is based on all
the facts and circumstances, including, for example, the amount of
business assets that continue to be used, or the number of employees
in the work force who continue employment, in an active trade or
business (although not necessarily the historic trade or business).
Where the corporation continues to utilize a significant amount of its
business assets or work force, the requirement of carrying on more than
an insignificant amount of an active trade or business may be met even
cease for a period
though all trade or business activities temporarilv
126
of time in order to address business exigencies.

123 Assume, as before, a discount rate of 8% and maximum use of NOLs each year
until they expire in 15 years.
124
1.R.C. § 269. The acquisition in this case is the bankruptcy reorganization; here the
former creditors of the loss corporation acquired stock for the old debt.
125
See Treas. Reg. § 1.269-7 discussion supra text accompanying note 79.
126

Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(d).
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The meaning of this provision is not crystal clear.127 While the provision
states that a loss corporation must carry on an active trade or business during
and after the bankruptcy proceeding, 128 it is unclear whether the company
must carry on the same active trade or business throughout, or whether merely
conducting any active trade and business will suffice. An example illustrates
the difference.
Ex.4 Loss Co. #1 manufactured airplane parts before, during, and after
the bankruptcy proceeding. Loss Co. #2 had also manufactured
airplane parts before filing a Chapter 11 petition, as well as during most
of the period of the bankruptcy proceeding. However, toward the end
of the proceeding it liquidated its airplane parts business and used the
proceeds to purchase franchises in a national fast food chain. Under
both readings of § 1.269-3(d), Loss Co. #1 would be allowed to use its
NOLs. Under the first reading of § 1.269-3(d) Loss Co. #2 would not be
entitled to retain its NOLs, because it changed its business. The second
reading, however, would allow it. Loss Co. #2 meets the standard of
the second reading because it is still conducting a business.
If the second reading is accurate, a loss corporation must merely be
continually engaged in some business throughout the period. If the old
business need not be continued, this regulation is an active trade or business
requirement, not a continuity of business requirement. 1 29 As long as the
business is active, it does not matter what the business is. However, if the funds
from the liquidation of the old business were used for portfolio investments,
this would probably be insufficient. 1 30 To resolve this conflict, it is necessary
to look at the precise wording of the regulation. It is best to start at the beginning
127

There is a split of opinion over the meaning of this section. See JACK S. LEVIN &
D. GINSBURG, MERGERs, ACQUISITIONS, AND LEVERAGED BUYouTs 11208.032
(1994); Lewis T. Barr, Net OperatingLosses- Sections 381, 382, and 269, Tax Management
Portfolio No. 27, A-52(3), 52(4) (both stating that this is not a continuity of business
requirement). But see Jacobs, supra note 91; Fergusson, infra note 209; Peter C. Cannellos,
Rethinking The Tax Aspects of Debt Restructuring, 70 TAXES 808, 818 (1992) (both stating
that it is a continuity of business enterprise requirement).
MARTN

128

Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(d).

129

An active trade or business requirement such as § 355(b)(1), requires that some
business be engaged in. In fact, the § 355(b)(1) rule has two parts: 1) an active trade or
business be conducted; and 2) that this business be conducted for five years prior to the
§ 355 transaction. In essence, this is a continuity of business enterprise requirement.
However, because of the way it is defined, the active trade or business requirement is
analytically distinct. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(iii) states that in order for the business
to be active, the corporation must itself perform active and substantial management and
operational functions. If § 1.269-(3)(d) is an active trade or business requirement, its
requirements are probably similar.
130
Under Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(1)(iv), merely holding stock or securities for
investment purposes is not an active trade or business. However, because § 1.269-3(d)
does not state what definition it uses for active trade or business, use of the I.R.C. § 355
definition is only suggestive.
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of the regulation and work through it. Each sentence will be analyzed to see
what light it throws on this question.
The relevant part of the first sentence, which sets forth the rule, requires that
a loss corporation carry on a significant amount of "an active trade or business
13 1
This sentence is the
during and subsequent" to the bankruptcy proceeding.
source of the ambiguity. It is not clear whether there must be at least one active
trade or business which was conducted both during and after the proceeding,
or whether a loss corporation may change its business at any time as long as it
is operating some business.
The next sentence states that the determination of whether the loss
corporation has met the § 1.269-3(d) standard is "made without regard to the
132
continuity of business enterprise requirement set forth in section 1.368-1(d)."
The regulation does not state that it is not a continuity of business requirement.
It only states that it is not § 1.368-1(d). It is unclear how much this helps to
resolve the issue. In defining a term, one usually takes special care to separate
the object defined from the things closest to it.133 Therefore, if the regulation
takes special care to separate itself from another continuity of business
requirement, this suggests it may have a continuity of business requirement.
On the other hand, one also attempts to separate terms from their opposites as
well. One may argue that § 1.269-3(d) is distancing itself from continuity of
business requirements. However, if the intent was to state that this provision
does not impose a continuity of business requirement, this could have been
stated more directly. A more logical phrasing would have been "[tihe
determination of whether the corporation carries on more than an insignificant
amount of an active trade or business is not predicated upon whether the same
business is conducted throughout the entire period." If, on the other hand, the
regulation is a continuity of business requirement, but has different rules than
§ 1.368-1(d), it would be phrased as it is. 13 4 No matter how this argument is
resolved, this sentence will not answer the larger question. It merely tells us
that this regulation is different from § 1.368-1(d), without affirmatively stating
what the standard is.
The next sentence seems to resolve the question. The regulation discusses
135
how to determine whether the loss corporation satisfies the requirements.
Not surprisingly, the decision is based on all the facts and circumstances. The
section then gives examples of the most important facts to be used in making
the determination. The only two facts discussed are the amount of business
13 1

Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(d).
1d. The Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) standard is the same as that used in § 382(c). See
supra note 69.
133
See Miles L. Hanley, Synonyms and Antonyms, in THE AMERICAN COLLEGE
DICTIONARY xxv-xxvi (Random House 1953).
134
For possible differences between § 1.269-3(d) and § 1.368-1(d), see discussion infra
text accompanying notes 146-54.
132

135

Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(d).
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assets that continue to be used and the number of employees who continue in
the employ of the loss corporation.136 The regulation gives no examples only
involving the active conduct of business. This strongly implies that the
regulation is a continuity of business requirement. If any active trade or
business would do, the continuity of the employees or assets would be
irrelevant. The amount and type of business assets would be important, but
not whether these were used before. 137 A business can be active even on its first
day of operation. However, if the question is one of business continuity, then
whether the assets or employees are the same is an important benchmark of
business continuity.138
It seems that this regulation requires that there be at least one trade or
business which is conducted on a significant scale both during and subsequent
to the bankruptcy proceeding. Apparently, termination of the loss
corporation's "old" business will result in a complete disallowance of its NOLs.
The final sentence seems to confirm this conclusion. This sentence states that
if the loss corporation continues the old business, it can temporarily stop the
business for emergencies and still meet the standard. It again refers to
continuity of assets and employees as the key to the section.
If, on the other hand, the section was only an active trade or business
requirement, this sentence would make the section incoherent. A temporary
shutdown of business is allowed only if there is continuity of business. If the
business is changed, time will be needed to sell the old assets, buy new assets,
hire new people etc. 13 9 If the business changes, there will likely be a certain
amount of down time which will cause it to run afoul of the section. So even if
the prior sentences allow the loss corporation to switch businesses, the last
sentence makes it difficult to accomplish.
If this were an active trade or business requirement, the section as a whole
would be inconsistent and incoherent. The first sentence would be ambiguous;
the second would be poorly written, the third sentence would focus on
irrelevant facts; the fourth sentence would impose an arbitrary restriction.
However, if business continuity is required, the first sentence's lack of clarity
is made up for by the examples in the third sentence, as well as by the fourth
sentence's explanation.
The Treasury can argue that this is a reasonable interpretation of § 269. Any
transaction to which this section applies would fit the "classic" definition of an
abusive transaction: the owners would be different from those who incurred

136Id.
137

The fact that they need not be used in the historic business is parallel to § 1.368-1(d).
Of course as with that restriction, if the same people must be employed, and the same
assets must be used the choice of businesses is severely restricted.
13 8

These are the most important factors in the determination of business continuity
under § 1.368-1(d).
13 9

For what is involved in starting a new line of business see generally RONALD E.

MERRIL & HENRY P. SEDGWICK, THE NEW VENTURE HANDBOOK (1987).
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140
the losses, and the business would have changed. One could view this as a
of § 269, which acts as a broad based attack on abusive
rational interpretation
14 1
transactions.
Another source of confusion with § 1.269-3(d) is the lack of clarity of the term
"strong evidence." "Strong evidence" is necessary to overcome the
presumption of tax avoidance. What constitutes "strong evidence?" This
142
standard is not used in any other place in the code or regulations. Neither is
this term self-defining. "Strong evidence" is probably greater than a
preponderance of the evidence. Currently, if the IRS asserts a deficiency based
on § 269, the taxpayer must show by a preponderance of the evidence that tax
avoidance was not its principal purpose. 143 This regulation would be
weakening the IRS's hand if a preponderance of the evidence is more difficult
to obtain than "strong evidence." This does not seem to be the intent of the
regulation. The question becomes how strong is "strong evidence?" This will
have to be resolved by the courts.
Even with these ambiguities, it is clear there are differences between the
"regular" continuity of business enterprise requirements and § 1.269-3(d). First,
the § 1.269-3(d) restriction is a presumption which can be rebutted with strong
evidence, rather that an absolute limitation like §382(c). In practice, this
difference is not likely to be important. As long as the focus is on the acquisition
of stock 144 and not on the acquisition of the original interest, reduction of taxes
was probably the prime motivation for the acquisition. 145 Therefore, in most
situations where § 1.269-3(d) applies, there is unlikely to be "strong evidence"
of some other purpose, notwithstanding the ambiguity in the term "strong
evidence."
Another difference between the regular § 382(c) limitation and § 1.269-3(d)
is that the § 382 limit applies for two years while there is no specified length of
time in the § 269 regulation. This creates even more ambiguity. There is no way
to determine how long a loss corporation must continue its business based on
the regulation itself. Requiring the business to continue in perpetuity seems

140

See discussion supra text accompaying notes 40-46.

14 1

See discussion supra textaccompanying notes 109-28. Seegenerally Watts, supranote
84.
142 The only use of the term "strong evidence" in the Code or Regulations is in the
regulations under § 355. These regulations state that a business purpose constitutes
"strong evidence" that the spin-off is not a device. This is a different context than
§ 1.269-3(d). It is unclear how it would apply here. The § 355 regulations do not further
define "strong evidence". For a further discussion of some of the interpretive problems
with § 1.269-3(d), see Richard Reichler, Presumption of Tax Avoidance Motive in Prop. Regs
Affects Many CorporateBankruptcies, 74 J.TAX'N 140 (1991).
143Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
144 Section 1.269-5 makes the focus of the analysis the acquisition of the stock itself.
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 153-54.
1451d.
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ridiculous, as does merely requiring that the business continue at least one day
after the end of the proceeding. This, too, will have to be resolved by the courts.
Another distinction between the regular continuity of business requirement
and § 1.269-3(d) is the business that must be continued. The § 382(c) rule
requires that the "historic trade or business" be continued. The "historic trade
or business" of a corporation is that which it conducted before the
transaction. 146 In the case of the bankruptcy reorganization, it would be the
business engaged in prior to the Chapter 11 filing.
Section 1.269-3(d) only requires that the same business be continued during
and after the bankruptcy proceeding. 147 In fact, it specifically states that it does
not have to be the historical trade or business. 148 Therefore, a transaction would
not be caught by § 1.269-3(d) if immediately prior to the Chapter 11 filing, a
loss corporation sold its historic business and acquired a new business. To
illustrate,
Ex 5. Assume Loss Co. has manufactured airplane parts for a number
of years. On April 19, 1992, the company liquidated this business and
used the proceeds to acquire fast food franchises. On April 20, 1992,
the corporation filed a Chapter 11 petition. The historic business of
Loss Co. would be the manufacture of airplane parts, because the
liquidation of the business was in contemplation of the bankruptcy
filing. Therefore, it remains the historic trade or business. Under the
§ 382(c) standard there would be no continuity of business. However,
under the § 1.269-3(d) standard an active trade or business was
conducted during and subsequent to the bankruptcy proceeding.
Therefore, this standard would be met.
In practice, this distinction will not matter except perhaps in pre-packaged
bankruptcies. 149 In order to save a loss corporation's NOLs the change in the
corporation's business must occur prior to the bankruptcy filing. The historic
owners of the corporation are still in control of it at that time. They decide
whether to alter the business. In non-pre-packaged bankruptcies it is generally
very difficult to determine who will end up acquiring control of the
corporation. 150 Therefore, even if they wanted to, it would be difficult for the

146
147
148

Sce discussion supra text accompanying notes 104-113.
Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(d).
1d.

149

A "pre-packaged" plan occurs when the debtor obtains the acceptance of its
creditors to its Chapter 11 reorganization plan prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b)(1988). In this case, the filing of the plan and the acceptance
by the court occur at almost the same time. This would allow the debtor to know who
will be in control of it before the filing of the petition, since the negotiations for what the

new business ought to be would be conducted prior to the filing of the petition.
Therefore, it would be possible to change the business prior to the filing of the petition.
150Jacobs, supra note 91.
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"historic" owners to decide what business would be most efficient for the new
owners.
The wording of the two limitations implies a similar amount of continuity.
Section 1.269-3(d) requires that a significant level of business be continued.
Section 382(c) requires a significant level of business be continued. For the level
of business to be not insignificant, it must be significant. Semantically, the
limitations are the same. However, it is unclear whether "significant" has the
same definition in both contexts.1 5 1 This will have to be decided by a court,
since § 1.269-3(d) implies that definitions used in § 1.368-1(d) are not
determinative for purposes of the regulation.
One of the main sources of ambiguity in § 1.269-3(d) is that it neither defines
its major terms, nor relies on definitions used in other regulations. The major
terms, therefore, do not yet have definitions. This problem is even worse than
it seems. Under most code sections, tax lawyers and planners can obtain private
letter rulings to be certain of the tax treatment of the transaction. However, the
service has adopted a "no-rulings" position that such rulings arenot to be issued
in connection with § 269 questions. 152 This increases uncertainty for those
planning these transactions.
Another provision of the regulations also adds an important piece to the
§ 269 analysis. The relevant portion of § 1.269-5(b) states that:
Solely for purposes of section 269, creditors of a bankrupt corporation
are treated as acquiring beneficial ownership of stock of the
than the time a bankruptcy court confirms a plan
corporation no earlier
153
of reorganization.
If the motives of new owners are determined as of the confirmation of the
plan and not when the creditors originally acquired their interests, it is very
likely that in § 1.269-3(d) situations the motivation for the acquisition was to
use the loss corporation's NOLs. If the new owners liquidated the old business
of the corporation and have started an entirely different business, they did not
acquire the corporation for its business assets. It is very likely they acquired the
corporation for its NOLs. If this is so, § 269 would prevent the loss corporation
154
from using its NOLs.

15

1The service has defined what significant is for reorganizations in various revenue

rulings as well § 1.368-1(d). See Faber, supra note 69.
152
Rev. Proc. 92-3, 1991 l.R.B. 40.
153

Treas. Reg. § 1.269-5(b).

154

0ne of the reasons for retaining the corporate shell is that certain assets such as
charters, etc., cannot be separated from the shell. But if the corporation is embarking on
a new business, it is unlikely that the old charters, etc., will be needed in this new
business.
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III. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF § 1.269-3(d)
The analysis of the economic effects of § 1.269-3(d) is divided into four parts.
The first part discusses the economic effects § 1.269-3(d) causes by altering the
structure of bankruptcy reorganizations. The second part discusses the effects
that occur when the section prevents bankruptcy reorganizations. If
§ 1.269-3(d) affects a transaction, one of these two effects must occur; people
will either change their behavior, thereby invoking the first effect, or suffer the
penalty, incurring the second effect. The third part discusses the effects of the
ambiguity of this regulation. The final section discusses other miscellaneous
issues that arise in connection with the regulation.
A. Alteration of Reorganizations
The most important economic effect of § 1.269-3(d) arises from how it alters
the structure of some reorganizations. The manner in which it does this
significantly impacts economic efficiency. This section will examine the
characteristics of the transactions affected by § 1.269-3(d). Then, it analyzes
how § 1.269-3(d) may alter these reorganizations. Finally, it discusses the effects
of these changes on economic efficiency.
As discussed above, a § 1.269-3(d) transaction would be "abusive" under the
"classic" definition 55 because both the owners and the businesses seeking to
use the NOLs have changed since the NOLs were created. There has to have
been an ownership change as a result of a bankruptcy proceeding in all of these
transactions, because § 382(l)(5) must apply in order for § 1.269-3(d) to apply.
In addition, at least 50% of the stock of the loss corporation must have been
acquired by qualified shareholders. If § 1.269-3(d) operates to disallow the
losses, the business which generated the NOLs must have been discontinued.
In a § 1.269-3(d) transaction, it is unlikely that there are any significant inputs
of capital. Section 1.269-3(b)(1) states that if the owners of a loss corporation
contribute capital into the corporation, such action is evidence that the
acquisition was for a tax avoidance purpose.156 Inputs of capital which go to
further a new business are particularly suspect because the NOLs must offset
income from a business which did not generate them. 157 This is precisely what
the NOL rules are attempting to avoid. Section 1.269-3(b)(1) is only one factor
to be weighed against others; it does not create a presumption. Other factors
may allow these inputs.158 However, it is likely that in any § 1.269-3(d)
situation, § 1.269-3(b)(1) will essentially prevent large inputs of capital.

15 5

Sce discussion supra text accompanying notes 40-46.

15 6

Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(b)(1).

15 7

If the old business is discontinued, and there are new inputs of capital, any income
generated by the new capital is, by definition, from a business other than that which
created the NOLs.
158 For example, the inputs were small, or they were necessary to shore up an ongoing
business.
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Section 1.269-3(d) was designed to deal with transactions where the loss
corporation discontinues its business while waiting to find a "suitor"159 to take
over the corporation. In these situations, the current owners of the loss
corporation understand that any suitor is unlikely to want to continue the
current business, and so they discontinue it. The Treasury viewed these
transactions as "abusive" and drafted regulations in order to prevent them.160
In sum, § 1.269-3(d) transactions possess four characteristics: 1) the loss
corporation is in bankruptcy, 2) § 382(l)(5) applies, 3) the business which
generated the NOLs is discontinued, and 4) there have been no significant
inputs of capital from the new owners.
Now that we have identified the affected transactions, the economic effects
of § 1.269-3(d) can be examined. This section will first discuss how this
provision can alter decisions made by the new owners of a loss corporation,
and how this affects economic efficiency. In particular, it will examine the effect
on investment decisions made by the owners of loss corporations. The analysis
will then proceed in two parts: 1) whether § 1.269-3(d) transactions1 61 raise
efficiency concerns similar to those raised by "abusive" transactions in general,
and 2) whether this regulation provides efficient incentives to the new owners
of loss corporations. The discussion will show that § 1.269-3(d) transactions do
not raise the same efficiency concerns as "abusive" transactions, and the
regulation provides inefficient incentives to the owners of newly reorganized
loss corporations.
Economic efficiency occurs when the resources within an economy are
allocated so that the total value of the resources is maximized. 162 One judges
the economic efficiency of a tax rule by whether it encourages people 163 to alter
their activities from those in which they would have engaged in a tax-free
world. 164 In a tax-free world, if someone engages in a particular activity, it is
because that person believes this activity will produce the most profit. 165 By
changing the activities people engage in, the tax system can reduce output by

159

A suitor is someone who will take over the corporation with the approval of the
current management.
160Under the classic definition of "abusive", the Treasury is correct. In any of these
transactions, the NOLs would offset income of a different business owned by different
people than that which generated the NOLs. For the Treasury's motives, see Haims,
supra note 92.
161
A § 1.269-3(d) transaction is a transaction to which that section applies. In essence,
it is a § 382(l)(5) transaction in which the old business has been discontinued.
162
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-15 (3d ed. 1986). This is
actually a special kind of efficiency called allocative efficiency.
163
"People" is used here in the same sense as the term "person" is used by the tax code.
It includes individuals, corporations, partnerships, etc.
164POSNER, supra note 162; see also Campisano & Romano, supra note 10.
165pOSNER, supra note 162.
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causing them to stop pursuing their most efficient activities and begin pursuing
others which are more profitable to them on an after-tax basis.
The efficiency problems with "abusive" transactions, as discussed in section
1,166 are the result of the tax code's incentives to acquire a corporation merely
for its NOLs. If someone acquires a loss corporation because of its tax benefits,
that person is not necessarily the most efficient user of the company's assets. 167
When the tax system causes a less efficient user to acquire the assets, it has
caused a drop in efficiency. 168
These concerns do not apply to § 1.269-3(d) situations. If the acquirers of
these loss corporations are not the most efficient users, it does not affect
efficiency. By definition, the acquirers have liquidated the loss company's
assets. Presumably, they have sold the assets to the person (or persons) able to
produce the most value from the assets and so are able to pay the highest
price. 16 9 Therefore, § 1.269-3(d) transactions do not involve the same efficiency
concerns as most other "abusive" transactions.
While no efficiency is gained by preventing these transactions, there is also
no direct efficiency gain by allowing them. The assets are likely to be acquired
by the same persons who would have held them after a Chapter 7
liquidation; 170 which would have occurred if there had been no Chapter 11
reorganization. The persons who have the highest value for the assets will still
have the highest value and, therefore, be able to pay the most. 171 The assets
will have the same value in either case. As discussed below, collateral efficiency
effects may arise from attempting to prevent these transactions.
The second part of the analysis will discuss the incentives this regulation
provides for the new owners of loss corporations to behave efficiently after the
acquisition. It will show that this regulation provides incentives to the new
owners to retain the current business, and this can cause a significant decrease
in efficiency.
As stated before, § 1.269-3(d) requires the new owners of a loss corporation
to retain a significant portion of the loss corporation's business in order to use
its NOLs.1 72 This creates an incentive for the new owners of the company to
retain its old business 173 even though another would be more profitable. This
166

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
1 Scc discussion supra text accompanying notes 78-99.
67

168
1f an asset produces $100 if used by A and $50 if used by B,all other things being
equal, it is most efficient for A to use the asset.
169
1f acquirers were the most efficient users, they would have no incentive to sell the
assets because no tax advantages flow with the assets themselves.
170
171

See supra note 89 for a definition of Chapter 7 liquidation.
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 72-88.

172

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 155-68.

173The old business is the business the loss corporation is engaged in at the beginning
of the bankruptcy proceeding.
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incentive arises because income from the old business is tax-free, up to the
amount of the loss corporation's NOLs. Income earned on any other business
is taxable if the loss corporation's old business is discontinued. To illustrate,
assume A acquires Loss Co., which is currently involved in Business #1. A has
two options: A can continue Business #1 or A can liquidate it and use the
proceeds to acquire Business #2. A is in the 30% tax bracket. Business #1 will
yield $50 to A per year. This income is tax-free because A can use the NOLs that
Loss Co. had generated prior to A's acquisition to offset the income. Business
#2 will earn A $60 a year, but the return on Business #2 is taxable because Loss
Co.'s NOLs cannot be used to offset this income. A will decide which asset to
acquire based on total after-tax earnings. 174 Total after-tax earnings are $50 for
Business #1 and $42 for Business #2.175 Therefore, A will retain Business #1,
even though it would be more efficient for the economy if A acquired Business
#2.
Section 1.269-3(d) creates this kind of incentive by allowing the loss
corporation to use its NOLs only if the old business is retained. If the loss
corporation retains the old business, the corporation can offset its income with
the NOLs. If this business is liquidated, the NOLs cannot be used. Thus, income
from the current business is tax-free, up to the amount of the NOLs, and income
from any other business is taxable.
This incentive can reduce output by an amount up to the present discounted
value of Loss Co.'s NOLs. That is, A would be willing to retain Business #1 until
the after-tax returns of Business #2 exceed the non-taxed returns of Business
#1. In the above example, Business #2 would have to earn more than $72 before
A would be induced to switch. 176
One can argue that the above analysis proves too much. This analysis applies
with seemingly equal force to the continuity of business enterprise requirement
for "regular" § 382 and § 382(l)(6) transactions. 177 Are these provisions
inefficient as well?
The argument does apply to these sections, and some commentators have
called for § 382(c) to be repealed for this reason. 178 However, there is a
distinction between "regular" § 382 situations, where § 382(c) applies, and
§ 1.269-3(d) situations. This difference is related to the reason for § 382(c). It
makes the argument against continuity requirements in § 1.269-3(d) situations
even stronger than in the other situations.

174

See POSNER, supra note 162.

175

Because Business #1's earnings are not taxed, pre-tax and after-tax income are the

same. For Business #2,$50 x .34 = $8of tax. So, after-tax earnings for Business #2are $50
- $8 or $42.
176$72 x .34 = $12, so that the after tax earnings would equal $50.
177 Section 382(c) applies to both types of transaction. See discussion supra text
accompanying notes 104-22; Prop. Reg. § 1.382-3(m)(2).
178

Yin, supra note 66.
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Section 382(c) is designed to discourage the acquisition of a loss corporation
for its tax attributes. The section attempts to ensure that only those interested
in keeping the business or its assets will be allowed to acquire the tax attributes
of a loss corporation. It does this by preventing a loss corporation which
liquidates its old business from using any of its NOLs. If an acquirer is
interested in either the business or the business assets of the loss corporation,
it will keep them, since that is why it purchased the corporation. Such an
acquirer would meet the § 382(c) requirements.
In a regular § 382 situation, acquirers are self-selected. They decide whether
to acquire the corporation or to use their capital in other ways. A rule designed
to alter behavior can work where the actions are voluntary. The acquirers in
bankruptcy are not self-selected. Most of the time, they did not initially wish
to acquire the loss corporation.1 79 They agreed to acquire the corporation when
it became the best way to recover their losses. This decision is very different
than the kind prevented in regular § 382 situations. In essence, the creditors
have already acquired the corporation even though they did not want it.180
Deterrence cannot work when the behavior is involuntary. 181 Therefore, the
new owners will suffer the penalty of this provision without behaving
2
improperly.18
B. Effects of Preventing Reorganizations
Section 1.269-3(d) also causes economic effects when it disallows NOLs.
When this occurs, the loss corporation will be liquidated rather than
reorganized. 183 If § 1.269-3(d) applies, the corporation's business assets have
been sold. It has no tax "assets" remaining because §269 disallowes them. There

179

1n particular, § 382(l)(5) restrictions are designed to ensure that the creditors who

acquire the loss corporation did not have this intention when they acquired their
interests. See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 97.
18 0
The creditors will either get the corporation itself, or the proceeds from the sale of
its assets. It is the creditors who will profit or lose from changes in the corporation's
value. They effectively own the corporation, even if they choose to liquidate it rather
than acquire its stock.
18 1

NIGEL WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY

56-59 (1969).

82

1 The new owners will still make the decision of whether to liquidate or not. This
decision, in and of itself, however, is not likely the result of a tax avoidance motive, and
so, is not likely to have efficiency consequences. The inefficiency problem results from
the acquisition of the NOLs. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 47-71. Once
the loss corporation has been acquired, they already have the NOLs. By itself, the
decision to liquidate the assets is not the cause of the inefficiency. The new owners would
only decide to sell the assets if they were not the most efficient users. The decision to
liquidate is used as a proxy under § 382(c) to see if the motive for the acquisition was
tax avoidance.
183
The corporation will undergo a liquidation under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code
rather than a reorganization tnder Chapter 11.
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is little reason for the loss corporation's continued existence, and so, it will
likely be liquidated. 184
Under § 1.269-3(d), NOLs are disallowed when § 382(l)(5) applies, and the
business of the loss corporation is discontinued. The owners of the loss
corporation will liquidate the old business when another business can generate
after-tax profits that exceed the old business's non-taxed profits. Since the
current corporate rate is 35%, if the alternative business can earn at least 1.5
times what the old business can, the new owners will liquidate the old
business. 185
Disallowing the NOLs in these situations will create a bias against
investment in risky businesses. Persons who lend money to risky businesses
include in their investment calculations the potential value of the loss company
in bankruptcy. 186 Section 1.269-3(d) reduces the value of a bankrupt
18 7
If the
corporation by destroying one its most important assets, its NOLs.
will
the
creditors
either
decreases,
bankruptcy
in
corporation
the
loss
value of
will
demand
creditors
or
the
the
corporation,
money
to
be less willing to lend
a higher rate of interest on the debt, or both. This creates a bias against risky
investments.
A bias against risky business may be compensating for a bias in their favor
in another part of the code. This new bias may, in fact, be making the system
more neutral. Economists refer to this as the theory of second best. 188 However,
the tax system is already biased against risky businesses. In particular, the NOL
rules penalize these ventures. For example, income taxes take approximately
34% of the profit of a corporation. NOLs only decrease taxes if there either has
been, or will be, a profit. If there is no profit, they are worthless. The corporate
income tax reduces upside profit by 34%, yet it does not decrease downside
losses. 189 Risky businesses are disproportionately harmed because they are less

184

HENDERSON & GOLDRNG, supra note 8, at 11201.

185

For a taxable source of income to produce as much after-tax profit as a non-taxed
source, the taxable source must generate returns greater than the non-taxed source by
a factor at least equal to the inverse of the tax rate. If the tax rate is 33% and the non-taxed
source produces a $200 return, the taxable source must produce a return of at least $300
to give the same after-tax return. ($300 x 33.3% = $100 of tax, so total after tax return is
$200).
18 6

Strand, supranote 96.

1 87

See Rizzi, supra note 8, at 140.

188

See R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. EcoN.
STUD. 11 (1956). The theory of second best states that when the economy is not operating
at optimal efficiency, an otherwise inefficient action might increase efficiency. For
example, if one type of investment is not taxed, it may increase efficiency to a place a
surtax on it. This would bring the relative returns on that investment to what it would
have been if it were taxed.
189 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Campisano & Romano, supra note 10.
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likely to produce a profit than stable businesses. 190 One particular form of risky
venture, start-up companies, receives particularly harsh treatment from § 382.
New companies, and risky companies generally, are likely to have more
ownership changes, 191 which causes the § 382 limitation to be invoked. This
substantially reduces the value of the NOLs, giving these businesses a
competitive disadvantage.1 92 This can have serious consequences because new
193
and risky ventures are one of the best sources of innovation and job creation.
In order to be more neutral, the system ought to give preferences to risky
ventures, not impose disincentives. This rule takes the system further away
from neutrality and decreases efficiency.
While this provision will raise revenue, 194 it does it in an inefficient manner.
It prevents transactions which present no efficiency loss, and it creates
tax-favored investments without regard to their efficiency. While it is true that

190

A risky business is less likely to earn a profit, that is what makes it risky.

191This is partially as a result of the way risky businesses are financed. Because of the
risk, investors do not want to initially place a lot of capital in the corporation atone time,
so they stage their investments over time. This allows the investors to gain more
information about the viability of the business before becoming fully committed. As
new investment flows in, it is likely to cause a § 382 ownership change. See generally
Richard L. Parker, The Innocent Civilians in the War Against NOL Trafficking: Section 382
and High-Tech Start-up Companies, 9 VA. T. REV. 625 (1990).
192
1f there are two businesses with equal NOLs and equal incomes, and one undergoes
an ownership change while the other does not, the corporation which does undergo the
ownership change is at a disadvantage because it can not fully use it NOLs while the
other business can.

193 These companies are the most important for economic growth. See generally
GEORGE GILDER, THE SPIRIT OF ENTERPRISE (1984).
194 The most obvious effect of disallowing NOLs is that it raises revenue. If deductions
are decreased, taxes are increased. One might imagine that this increase would be equal
to the present value of the NOLs disallowed. However, the amount of increase in
revenue is less than this. If the NOLs are entirely disallowed because of § 1.269-3(d), the
Treasury will collect more revenue because of the lack of these deductions. This increase
in revenues is offset by the increased bad debt deduction that the lenders would take if
the NOLs disappeared, but will not take if the NOLs survive. If the creditors of the loss
corporation will incur a loss on the debt, they are entitled to a deduction (§ 166 for
non-security holders and § 165 for security holders, because a liquidation will not result
in a recapitalization under § 368 (a)(I))(E)). If the loss corporation could utilize the
NOLs, the value of its stock would be increased. Since the value that the creditors receive
is increased, the amount of their bad debt deduction is decreased. This decrease is equal
to the amount by which the value of the NOLs increases the value of the stock (in other
words the NOLs' present value). To illustrate this, assume Loss Co. has NOLs with net
discounted present value of $20 million. The value of the stock without the NOLs is $1
million. Therefore, if the NOLs are allowed the value of the stock the creditors will
receive is $21 million. The value of what the creditors receive has been increased by the
value of the NOLs. The creditors deduction has therefore dropped by an amount equal
to the value of the NOLs. If they are in the 30% tax bracket, the $20 million revenue loss
is offset by a $6 million increase in revenue due to the creditor's not taking the deduction
for their losses.
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§ 1.269-3(d) transactions are "abusive," the costs to efficiency by attempting to
prevent them are greater than the benefits.
C. Problems Due to Uncertainty
The above discussion assumed that when the plan is confirmed, all parties
to a bankruptcy reorganization (the creditors, shareholders, etc.) are certain of
§ 1.269-3(d)'s consequences on the NOLs of the loss corporation.195 However,
this will often not be the case. One reason for this is the ambiguity in
§ 1.269-3(d). For example, while this paper concludes that the provision
imposes a continuity of business requirement, there is not universal agreement
on this.196 In addition, many of the terms used in § 1.269-3(d), such as "strong
evidence" and "significant" continuity of the business, as well as uncertainty as
to how long the business must be continued, are ambigous.
Uncertainty in the meaning of a provision can seriously affect efficiency. It
increases transaction costs because it requires more research by lawyers and
accountants. 197 Risk itself is a cost because it decreases the utility of those who
bear it.19 8 It makes creditors less likely to lend to risky businesses which have
a possibility of filing a Chapter 11 petition. 199 Furthermore, this section imposes
added costs on a class of businesses least able to afford it: risky and failing
businesses. 200 All of these costs are incurred without any increase in
productivity, thereby decreasing efficiency.
These ambiguities will eventually be resolved by the courts. But that is a
costly way to resolve them in terms of the legal bills for litigating the matter,
and in terms of the costs of altered transactions that decrease output.
D. Miscellaneous Arguments
One may argue that even though a continuity of business requirement is
inefficient, providing a break to one type of transaction and not to other types
may decrease efficiency even more than allowing no relief. By creating a
non-neutral provision, it may over-encourage the use of the tax favored type

195This

is when the bankruptcy court agrees with the plan for reorganization. It is
then that the exact structure of the reorganization is enacted.
196

See Barr, supra note 127; Blashek supra note 127.
See James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, 45 TAX L. REV. 7, 19
(1989); James L. Payne, Unhappy Returns: The $600 Billion Rip-Off TAX NOTES TODAY
264-57 (Dec. 31, 1991), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT file.
197

198

POSNER, supra note 162.

199 Roger H. Gordon & Burton G. Malkiel, Corporate Finance, in How TAXES AFFEcr
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (Aaron & Pechman eds. Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.,
1981).
200

HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 8; see also SOL STEIN, BANKRUPTCY: A FEAST FOR

LAWYERS (1992).
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of transaction. This is another manifestation of the theory of second best.20 1 In
the current situation, requiring one type of bankruptcy reorganization,
§ 382(l)(6) reorganizations, to continue the old business, while not requiring
another type of bankruptcy reorganization, § 382(l)(5) reorganizations, to
continue the old business may over-encourage the use of § 382(l)(5), and, as a
result, decrease efficiency.
However, the theory of second best does not apply here. This theory only
operates when there is an efficiency loss from encouraging one type of
transaction over another.20 2 As we shall see, whichever code section applies,
the underlying business and asset structure of the loss corporation will be the
same, so there is no efficiency loss from this choice.
The choice between § 382(l)(5) and § 382(l)(6) occurs in two situations: 1) if
the loss corporation elects § 382(l)(6) treatment under § 382(l)(5)(H), and 2) if
the loss corporation does not qualify for §382(l)(5) due to the amount of stock
held by non-qualified shareholders. If the loss corporation elected for
§ 382(l)(6) to apply, this decision only affects the tax treatment; it would not
alter the underlying structure of the deal. 203 Therefore, efficiency is the same.
If the reorganization does not qualify for § 382(1)(5), this is because too many
non-qualified creditors received stock of the corporation, not because of the
nature of the business the loss corporation will enter, or how it will conduct
that business. This fact affects which creditors will receive equity, and which
will receive debt, but it does not affect the corporation itself.204 There is no
efficiency loss by having more § 382(l)(5) transactions than § 382(l)(6)
205
transactions.
One may also argue that the reorganizations covered by § 1.269-3(d) were
not intended to receive the special treatment of § 382(1)(5). The intent behind
allowing special NOL rules in bankruptcy was to encourage rehabilitation of
businesses. If a loss corporation does not retain the old business, then it should

201

See supra note 188. Here aga in, the system would not be performing optimally, and
so another inefficient action may increase efficiency.
202
The tax system can reduce efficiency significantly by encouraging one activity
preferentially to another, and thereby changing the rate of substitution. See RICHARD
MUSGRAVE & PEGGY MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE INTHEORY AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1980).
203
1f the election occurs, there are only two differences in the actions by the loss
corporation: 1)an election is filed with thelRSand 2) the NOL treatment of the corporate
tax returns. Neither affects how the assets of the corporation are used.
2 04
There may be some effects because of the different treatment of old debt holders
versus new, but a prioriit is difficult to tell how this would affect decisions. New debt
holders would have to be compensated as well, and the affects depend on the
compensation given, which would be different in each transaction.
205Generally, the decision between § 382(l)(5) and § 382(1)(6) is not made based on the
continuity of business. The decision is generally based upon the size of the interest
deduction in the last three years. This results because § 382(l)(5) will remove these
deductions from the NOLs. See Lee A. Sheppard, The Unused Bankruptcy Exceptions, 57
TAX NOTES 709, 710 (1992).
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not be entitled to retain NOLs either. This is not an efficiency argument, but a
question of intent behind the rules. In fact, rehabilitation is often at odds with
neutrality.206 Rehabilitation is the result of the government encouraging an
activity which would not otherwise take place. Therefore, rehabilitation does
not necessarily increase efficiency. From an economic standpoint, that
07
§ 1.269-3(d) encourages rehabilitation is an argument for withdrawing it.2
IV. ALTERNATIVES PROPOSED

Section 1.269-3(d) created a great deal of controversy when it was first
proposed. 208 Almost all the commentators who addressed the regulation called
on the Treasury to withdraw or substantially change it.209 Some of the
commentators proposed alternatives to the regulation. The most prominent
alternatives were the American Bar Association (ABA) report 2 10 and The New
York State Bar Association (NYSB) report.211 These reports are similar in many
ways. They both propose that the current § 269 regulations be rescinded and
replaced by a list of factors to be used in determining whether the principal
purpose of the acquisition was tax avoidance. 2 12 Both differ significantly from
§ 1.269-3(d) because neither allows any individual factor to create a
presumption of tax avoidance. They are both "totality of the circumstances"
tests.
However, significant differences exist between the reports. The NYSB
proposal only applies to cases where the loss corporation is the subject of a
bankruptcy proceeding. The ABA proposal, in contrast, applies to all § 269
determinations, not just those in which the loss corporation is in bankruptcy.

206Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Casefor CorporateReorganizations,15 J. LEGAL STUD.
127(1986).
20 7

See id. at 206; see also Korobkin, supra note 7.

20855 Fed. Reg. 33,139 (1990).
20 9

ABA Members Find Regs on Ownership ChangesInconsistentwith Tax Laws, TAX NOTES
TODAY203-33 (Oct. 1,1991), availablein LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT file [hereinafterA BA];
PhiladelphiaBar Asks IRS to Withdraw Tax-Avoidance PresumptionProvisions,TAX NOTES
TODAY, June 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT file; New York State Bar
Association, Report on Proposed Treasury Regulations Under Sections 269 and 382, TAX
NOTES, Jan. 28, 1991, available in LEXIS, Fedtax library [hereinafter NYSB Report]; New
York Attorneys Offer a List of Factors as Replacenientfor Presumption Containedin Proposed
Section 269 Regulations, TAX NOTES TODAY 204-49 (Oct. 4,1990), availablein LEXIS, Fedtax
library, TNT file (containing proposal of M. Carr Fergusson and Leslie Hoffman Altus)
[hereina fter New York Attorneys].
2 10

ABA, supra note 209.

21INYSB Report, supra note 209. The proposal put forth by M. Carr Fergusson and
Leslie Hoffman Altus discussed in New York Attorneys, supranote 209, is very similar to
the NYSB Report, which both helped to prepare. Due to the similarities in these reports,
only the NYSB Report is discussed separately.
2 12

See ABA, supra note 209.
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The most significant difference, for purposes of this paper,213 is the factors

each uses. While the topics addressed by the two reports are similar, there is a
difference in basic approach. The ABA report uses eight factors which are rather
specific, and asks pointed questions. The NYSB report uses five factors which
are more inclusive, and asks more general questions.
The discussion of the two reports will begin with the ABA proposal, going
through its factors in order. The discussion then turns to the factors in the NYSB
report, comparing and contrasting them with the ABA report. The discussion
will focus on the report's impact on § 1.269-3(d) transactions, but more general
points will be addressed as well. The section ends by giving some suggestions
for shaping alternative regulations as well as providing other possible
measures.
Under the ABA set of factors, the first factor is whether the NOLs have been
subject to other limits. 214 (e.g., § 382) If the losses have been subject to other
limits it is less likely that the acquisition was for tax avoidance purposes.2 15
This point should be included in any analysis of motives. If the NOLs are
sufficiently restricted so that they have little or no value, it is unlikely that the
principal purpose of the acquisition was to obtain them for tax avoidance. If,
on the other hand, the NOLs have significant value, then NOLs possibly were
the purpose of the transaction.
The current § 1.269-7 asks a similar question. However, the ABA report
considers limitations the regulations do not.216 Section 1.269-7 only considers
the limits imposed by §§ 382 and 383, while the ABA report also considers the
limitations imposed by the SRLY and CRCO rules. 217 These later provisions
can limit the usefulness of NOLs as well and so should be considered.
The second factor asks whether there was a significant shift in ownership
prior to the § 382(l)(5)(E) period. 218 That is, this factor examines whether there
was substantial trading in the debt claims of the loss corporation prior to the
18-month period before the filing of the chapter 11 petition. Looking at these
transactions may help to find tax avoidance transactions in some cases.
However, if the creditors have held the debt for longer than 18 months, they
have taken a substantial business risk that either the loss corporation may
recover and never file a petition, or that the corporation may incur so much
debt that becoming a creditor is not a cost-effective way to acquire NOLs.

213 This paper deals with situations where the loss corporation is in bankruptcy.
Therefore, both proposals cover all the transactions at issue in this paper.
214

See ABA, supra note 209.

215

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 124-25.

216

ABA, supra note 209.

217

Sce supra note 15; see also ABA, supra note 209.

8

21 ABA, supra note 209.
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are not
Because of this, Congress determined that transactions before this time
2 19
relevant to the question and should be of minor significance at best.
The third and fourth factors deal with the loss corporation's situation at the
time of the original borrowing or when the new shareholders acquired their
interest in the corporation. 220 If the debtor had substantial losses at that time,
or was insolvent, it is more likely that tax avoidance was the purpose of the
acquisition. 22 1 Both of these factors argue for a disallowance of the NOLs
because the creditor knew or might have known that there was a substantial
chance it could acquire the losses. However, in nearly all cases some of the
creditors will have acquired their interests in the loss corporation when it had
losses, and some when it was in bankruptcy.222 So, this factor should not be
viewed as the touchstone of tax avoidance. Furthermore, this problem is of
diminished significance for § 1.269-3(d) transactions. By definition, these
transactions are covered by § 382(l)(5), and this code section prevents those
who acquire their interest close to or after the filing of the petition from gaining
control. 223 These restrictions prevent investors who are merely interested in
acquiring the NOLs from using them. In order to prevent tax motivated
transactions, the question should not be merely whether the creditors knew
that they may be able to acquire the losses, but should include whether
acquiring the debt appeared to be a cost-effective way of acquiring the NOLs.
If not, then it is unlikely the acquisition of the NOLs was the purpose of the
transaction. While the facts discussed in these factors point toward a tax
avoidance motive, they alone should not be sufficient for finding such a motive.
The fifth factor looks to the amount paid for the debt.224 If the creditor paid
more for the debt than its fair value based on the expected recovery of claims
(excluding the tax benefits), it seems likely the creditor was paying for the tax
benefits. According to the ABA report, this is evidence of a tax avoidance
motive. 22 5 While this seems reasonable on first glance, any transaction which
occurs while bankruptcy is reasonably possible will involve compensation for
potential tax benefits. The seller of the interest would not sell its interest in the
219

This is the reason for the § 382(l)(5) restrictions on stock ownership. See New York

Attorneys, supranote 209; NYSB Report, supra note 209. For a discussion of the operation
of the market for securities of failing corporations see Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 97.
220
ABA, supra note 209.
22

1The third factor asks if the debtor had substantial losses. The fourth factor asks if
the debtor was insolvent.
222

0ne of the chief reasons for pursuing a bankruptcy petition is to encourage
creditors to start to lend to the bankrupt corporation. As long as the business continues,
there will be continued need for credit. HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 8; Stein,
supra note 200.
223
But see discussion of the eighth factor, infra text accompanying notes 236-38. It
examines one type of transaction which § 382(l)(5) does not protect against.
224

ABA, supra note 209.

2251dj.
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corporation to the purchaser unless the purchaser compensates it for the
expected value of the tax benefits. 22 6 If an interest is acquired when bankruptcy
is a serious consideration, there will be a premium for the tax benefits. While
the ABA report does not specifically discuss it, any conclusion based on this
factor should look to the relative amount of the acquisition premium versus
the underlying value of the assets. If the premium is not substantial compared
to the underlying value, tax avoidance was probably not the principal purpose.
The final three factors all deal with the actions of the loss corporation after
the acquisition. In particular, the sixth factor, which is similar to § 1.269-3(d),
states that if the loss corporation failed to continue a significant amount of
business or generate more than nominal revenues from its historic business,
227
this is evidence of a tax avoidance purpose.
This factor has some of the same definitional problems as § 1.269-3(d). It is
not entirely clear if this is a continuity of business requirement or an active trade
or business requirement. If the loss corporation conducts an active business, it
meets the standard of either conducting an active business or continuing the
old business. However, requiring the loss corporation to either conduct an
active business or continue the old business is redundant. If it continues the
old business, it will almost certainly be conducting an active trade or business.
There is a way to read this factor to avoid these problems. One can view it
as asking two separate questions. First, is the historic business still conducted?
Second, is the loss corporation conducting an active trade or business? If the
first question is answered in the negative, the inquiry moves to the second.
While not continuing the historic trade or business would be evidence of a tax
avoidance purpose, conducting no active business would be even greater
evidence. Note that the first question is more restrictive than § 1.269-3(d)
because it looks for the historic business, while the regulation is slightly more
lenient. 228
Business continuity should be part of any § 269 determination. If the old
business is sold, the acquriers were not interested in the business assets of the
loss corporation. In this case, acquisition of the tax attributes was very likely
the prime motive. This may seem at odds with what was said in the discussion
of incentives to retain the old business of the loss company.229 However, the
ABA report's approach is better than § 1.269-3(d). This principle is best
included as one of many factors, rather than allowed to create a presumption.
If it is merely a factor, other evidence can more easily overcome this fact, or it
can be ignored in the appropriate circumstances. In § 1.269-3(d) situations, if
the creditors takeover it is unlikely they acquired the debt with a tax avoidance

22 6

Unless the seller is unaware of the tax benefits, or unable to use them.

22 7

ABA, supra note 209.

228

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 172-76.

229

Se supra section II.A.
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motive.23 0 Therefore the NOLs may be allowed. The loss corporation would
not necessarily have to continue the old business. For example, if the
corporation had substantial business reasons for the liquidation, these would
more easily overcome a factor than the § 1.269-3(d) presumption, because
"strong evidence" is required to override it.
The seventh factor, which is similar to § 1.269-3(b)(1), states that if the new
owners of the loss corporation infused capital into the corporation, it indicates
a possible tax avoidance motive.231 This goes to the root of what causes
inefficiency in acquisitions. Inefficiencies can only arise when NOLs are used
to offset a "pool of capital" 2 32 different from that which generated them. If the
corporation retains the same pool of capital, the new owners will have the
proper incentive. To illustrate this, assume a loss corporation, XCo., is acquired
by its creditors. Assume also that XCo. has substantial NOLs. The new owners
will seek to make the most efficient use of its assets, even if the most efficient
use of the assets is to sell them. If these NOLs can only offset income from the
X Co.'s pre-acquisition pool of capital, 233 the NOLs cannot create inefficient
incentives. In order for NOLS to create inefficient incentives for acquisitions,
there must be a disparity between the value the current owners assign to them
and the value a potential purchaser assigns to them. 234 If the NOLs can only
offset income from the same pool of capital, and the potential purchaser has a
higher value for these NOLs, the purchaser must be able to produce more
income from the assets of the corporation. 235 Therefore, it would be efficient
for the purchaser to acquire the assets. If no infusions of capital are allowed,
the NOLs must offset the same pool of capital. Consequently, the acquisition
must be efficient.

230
23

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 127-38.

1ABA, supra note 209.

232

The pool of capital of a corporation is an abstraction of the capital owned by the

corporation. For example, if a corporation owns one truck, that is its pool of capital.
However, the pool of capital is not identical to the truck. If the corporation sells the truck
and uses the proceeds to invest in bonds, the income from the bonds is generated by the
same pool of capital that produced the income from the truck. Therefore, both the actual
assets themselves, or theliquidationvalue, are manifestations of the moreabstract"pool"
of capital. If on the other hand, the owners of the corporation contributed capital and
purchased another truck, the income from this second truck would be generated by a
different pool of capital.
233
1f the new owners contribute capital to the corporation, any income generated by
it would not be from the pre-acquisition pool of capital.
2 34

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 47-71.
1f there is additional income to offset the pre-acquisition NOLs, this new income
can only have one source: the assets of the corporation. The NOLs can only offset income
from these assets. This income may be derived either directly from the assets or
indirectly by selling them. For why a higher value for NOLs equates with increased
efficiency, see discussion supra text accompanying notes 61-70.
23 5
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The eighth and final factor states that if the benefit of the losses shifts to
persons other than the historical shareholders and to creditors in a transaction
subsequent to the bankruptcy reorganization, it is evidence of a tax avoidance
purpose. 236 This factor would act as a back-stop to the § 382(1)(5) requirements.
Section 382(l)(5) restricts who can own shares if a bankruptcy reorganization
results in an ownership change, and it also prohibits second ownership changes
for two years. However, a literal reading of the statute would not prohibit a
transaction where a new creditor acquired 49% of the debt the day before the
bankruptcy filing (assuming that all the remaining creditors are qualified
creditors), then after the confirmation of the plan this non-qualified creditor
acquired up to 49% of the loss company stock.237 This second acquisition of
stock would not be an ownership change, 238 and so, would not be prevented
by § 382(l)(5). Yet, this transaction would be an end-run around the rules. The
owner of 98% of the stock of the loss corporation could have intended to acquire
the NOLs all along. Nevertheless, the corporation would still be able to use the
NOLs.
In contrast to the ABA report, the NYSB report only includes five factors. The
first deals with business continuity.239 If the historic business of the acquired
corporation is not continued, it is evidence of a principal purpose of tax
avoidance. This factor is similar to the sixth factor of the ABA report. One
difference between the reports is the NYSB version's meaning is clearer than
the ABA's. The NYSB report clearly looks for business continuity and not
merely whether there is an active trade or business.
The second factor looks to the relationship of creditors to losses. 240 This
factor is much like factors three and four in the ABA proposal. It is, however,
more general in scope. Whether there were losses or whether the loss
corporation was insolvent at the time is important, but other facts may also be
included in this version. 24 1 The NYSB formulation seems better than the ABA
formulation. As stated in connection with the ABA report, these ABA factors
are useful but should not be decisive. If there are additional circumstances
which indicate both that creditors knew there would be a Chapter 11
proceeding, and that this would be a cost-effective way to acquire the loss

236

A BA, supra note 209.
This example assumes the new creditor did not hold options on the 49% of the
stock acquired after the reorganization.
23 8
For an ownership change there must be a 50% shift in ownership since the last
ownership change. I.R.C. § 382(g). The last ownership change was the bankruptcy
reorganization, and there has only been a 49% ownership shift since that time.
23 9
NYSB Report, supra note 209.
237

240/d
24 1

1d. Examples include whether the losses were cost-effectively acquired, whether
they were about to expire, and the ability of the acquirer to use the losses given its income
and NOL position.
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corporation's NOLs, then the NOLs should be disallowed. These facts would
not be included under the ABA formulation.
The third NYSB factor looks to whether interests in the loss corporation have
242
If there was trading
shifted just prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
those who
is
possible
it
petition,
right before the filing of the bankruptcy
estimate
could
and
corporation
the
acquire
acquired the debt knew they would
to
attempting
were
the
creditors
that
the value of the NOLs. It is more likely
and
benefits
these
of
value
the
of
certain
be
could
they
obtain tax benefits if
lessened significance
their ability to acquire them. However, this problem is of243
applies.
382(l)(5)
§
because
transactions,
for § 1.269-3(d)
The fourth factor looks to whether there was a decrease in tax benefits due
to § 382(l)(5) or § 382(l)(6).244 This is very similar to the first factor in the ABA
245
proposal and also to § 1.269-7 of the regulations. The NYSB version is similar
to the ABA version because both examine all of the NOL limitations. One
difference between the ABA and NYSB formulations is that the NYSB factor
looks to whether the other limitations actually decreased the amount of the
NOLs, whereas the ABA factor looks to whether the NOLs were subject to
possible restriction. The NYSB formulation is more practical. If the NOLs were
subject to limitation, but not significantly affected, tax avoidance is still
possible.
The fifth and final factor in the NYSB proposal is whether there are other
2 46
This is a catchall provision that is
business purposes for the acquisition.
designed to allow for inclusion of other facts going to the intent of the acquirers.
The ABA does not include this in its set of factors. It is useful to have such a
factor, because it allows for inclusion of facts that could not be foreseen during
the writing of the regulations. If tax motives were a large part of the decision,
but there were even more substantial business motives, § 269 would allow the
247
NOLs.
As for choosing between these proposals, the NYSB report seems superior
to the ABA report. The NYSB report's factors are more general, but they seem
to allow for more facts to be included in the decision. Because of this generality,
they give less guidance to those who must make decisions on § 269 questions.
While guidance is useful, § 269 is, after all, a facts and circumstances provision,

2421,1.
243

Beca use of the § 382(l)(5) restrictions on ownership of stock, it is less likely the new
owners were attempting to acquire the NOLs. See sources cited supra note 209.
244 NYSB Report, supra note 209.
245

See discussion supra text accompanying note 79.

6

24 NYSB Report, supra note 209.
24 7

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 124-30.
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not an objective rule like § 382. Therefore, if the questions asked are too specific,
the analysis might ignore important aspects of the transaction. 248
An even better approach to dealing with these situations would be to
combine the ABA and NYSB proposals. Under this regime, the regulations
would first ask the general question posed in the NYSB report and then
elaborate on the meaning of this by including the more specific questions of
the ABA report, as well as other questions.24 9 or example, the § 269 regulations
should examine, as the second NYSB factor does, the relationship of the
creditors to the losses. The section dealing with this point might then elaborate
by asking more specific questions such as, whether, if at the time of the original
borrowing, the debtor had substantial losses or was insolvent, as the third and
fourth ABA factors, respectively, discuss. It should also examine the amount
paid for the debt as the fifth ABA factor does. If the regulations were structured
this way, they would be free to consider these facts and others as well. The
regulations would have both the freedom of the NYSB factors and the guidance
of the ABA factors.
However the regulations are constructed, they should examine the
transactions that occur subsequent to the plan confirmation. Transactions
which attempt to thwart the restrictions of § 382(l)(5) should be prevented, even
though the plan was already confirmed before this was apparent. This would
prevent transactions such as that discussed in connection with the eighth ABA
factor.
One point in favor of both of these proposals is that neither establishes a
continuity of business requirement, although the lack of business continuity is
a factor to consider. As examined in section II, a continuity of business
requirement would be inefficient. To the extent they lessen this requirement,
they improve efficiency.
Another argument supporting these reports is that § 269 is too vague and
uncertain in its application. 250 To the extent that they add some certainty they
should be welcomed. However, it is unclear how much certainty either adds.
There have been a number of cases under § 269 and in some sense these
proposals simply reiterate their holdings. 25 1 They do not tell judges what
weight to give to each of the factors. Yet, the weight given to the factors can
determine the outcome. However, adopting these proposals would result in a

248
Stephen J. McGarry, Note, State of Mind Standards in Taxation, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y.
249, 277 (1988).
249
The current § 269 regulations are structured much like this. However, having been
adopted at different times they are longer and more ad hoc. They do not set forth a clear
process to decide if the transaction was for tax avoidance purposes. See Watts, supra note
85.
2 50
1d.
2 51

BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 42, at
14.02, abstract out various consistent
holdings in § 269 case law. Most of these are reflected in the factors in the ABA and
NYSB reports.
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set of regulations that would be shorter and clearer than the current set. This
clarity might yield an increase in certainty.
There are other less drastic things that could be done to solve some of the
problems discussed in this paper. First, the service could issue revenue rulings
with respect to points of law under § 1.269-3(d). This would clarify how the
service interprets the regulation and would give planners more confidence in
their calculation of the tax consequences of their transactions.
Another possibility is to rescind § 1.269-3(d) and alter § 1.269-5(b) so that no
business continuity requirement exists for § 382(l)(5) transactions. As shown
before, the transactions covered by these sections, while "abusive" under the
classic definition, do not implicate efficiency concerns. Trying to prevent them
imposes costs which outweigh the benefits.
V. CONCLUSION

Section 1.269-3(d) is an example of a regulation that seems to be preventing
illegitimate transactions, but in so doing creates greater costs than benefits.
Section 1.269-3(d) transactions are by the classic definition "abusive". However,
as we have seen, attempting to prohibit them results in greater problems than
allowing them.
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